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I. INTRODUCTION
Restrictions on the transferability of securities are regulated under state law
within a permissive framework.1 Many business corporation statutes authorize a
restriction on transfer to be imposed by the articles of incorporation, 2 by the by-laws3
or by an agreement among any number of securityholders. 4 Case law in most states
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1. The law governing restrictions on the transfer of stock is largely a product of state court decisions.
Nevertheless, there are currently twenty jurisdictions that have statutes expressly authorizing restrictions on the transfer
of shares and imposing notice requirements in order for the restrictions to be valid. See ALA. CODE § 10-2A-41 (1975);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-26-610 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-306a (1987); Dn.. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (1983);
IDAHO CODE § 30-1-23A (1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-26-8 (West Supp. 1987-88); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6426 (1983);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 616 (1964); MicH. Cote'. LAws ANN. §§ 450.1473 (West 1973); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.429 (VWEr 1985); Motrr. CODE ANN. § 35-1-617 (1987); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 78.242 (Michie 1986);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:7-12 (West 1969); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.25 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1055
(,Vest 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1613.1 (Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-21.1 (1985); Tnx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 2.22 (Vernon 1980); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-649 (1985); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-132 (1977); see also Rnv.
MODEL Bus. CORP. Act § 6.27 (1984). In fifteen other jurisdictions, the relevant statute provides that restrictions must
be noted on the share certificate to be validly imposed. See ALA. CODE § 10-2A-41(a) (1975); Apiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §
10-023(D) (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 10-64-211(B) (1987); CAL. CORP. CODE § 418(a)(1) (West 1975); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 202(a) (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-320 (1954); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.067(3) (West 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-6426(a) (1983); LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 12:57(F) (1969); MINN. STAT. § 302A.409 subd. 2 (west 1985); MD. CoRPs.
& AW5'NS CODE ANN. § 2-21 l(d) (1985); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 27(b) (Law. Co-op. 1979); Otio REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.25(B) (1979); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 14, § 1508 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-16-208 (Supp. 1987). Ten
jurisdictions do not deal with restrictions on the transfer of shares in their corporate statutes: Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois,
Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. See generally 6 Z.
CnAvrrcHl, BusiNEsS ORGANIzAtioNs § 113 (1987); 2 F.H. O'NAJ., CosE Cons'ORAoNs § 7.06 (1971); W. Ft.ErcHR,
CvCoPEIA OF THE LAw oF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5461.1, et seq. (rev. perm. ed. 1985).
2. See, e.g., A.A. ConE § 10-2A-41(b) (1975); Ansz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-023(D)(3) (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 4-27-627(A) (1987); DEs. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(b) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.164(j)(2) (west 1976); IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-1-26-8(a) (West Supp. 1987-88); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 616(1) (1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 1055 (West 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1613.1 (Purdon Supp. 1987). Case law also supports the creation of transfer
restrictions in the articles of incorporation. See, e.g., Avoyelles Trust & Savings Bank v. Estate of Liliedahl, 350 So. 2d
1228 (La. 1977); Ling & Co. v. Trinity Savings & Loan Ass'n, 482 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1972); Monacan Hills v. Page,
203 Va. 110, 122 S.E.2d 654 (1961).
3. See, e.g., A.A. CODE § 10-2A-41(b) (1975); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-023(D)(3) (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 4-27-627(A) (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-306a (1987); DEs. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(b) (1983); HAw. Rnv.
STAT. § 416-80 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-23A(b) (1980); INsD. CODE ANN. § 23-1-26-8(a) (West Supp. 1987-88); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 616(2) (1964); NEv. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 78.242 (Michie 1986); N.D. CENr. CODE
§ 10-19.1-70 (1985); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-132 (1977); Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 348, 391 P.2d 828 (1964); Rainwater v. Milfield, 485 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). But in the absence of
authority in the articles of incorporation or statutes, a corporation has no power to adopt bylaws prohibiting or
unreasonably restricting transfers. See, e.g., Strong v. Borward County Kennel Club, 65 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Fla. 1946);
Wentworth v. Russell State Bank, 167 Kan. 246, 205 P.2d 972 (1949); Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 17 Del. Ch.
343, 152 A. 723 (1930); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 296.14 (1987) ("No corporation shall make any bylaw to restrain the
free sale of shares of its stock; every such bylaw shall be void.").
4. See, e.g., ALA. ConE § 10-2A-41(b) (1975); ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-023(D)(3) (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 4-27-627(A) (1987); Co.N. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-306a (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-26-8(a) (West Supp. 1987-88);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 616(2) (1964); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 78.242 (Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A:7-12 (West 1969); N.D. CEr. CODE § 10-19.1-70 (1985); VA. COD ANN. § 13.1-649 (1985); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §
17-1-132 (1977); Estate of Riggs v. Midwest Steel & Iron Works, 36 Colo. App. 302, 540 P.2d 361 (1976); Eggeson v.
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reaches the same result. 5 Partnership statutes permit general and limited partnerships
contractually to define the rights of a partner to transfer his interest in the
partnership. 6 Whether relying on a statute or on authoritative precedent, issuers of
securities and the holders themselves have the discretionary power to place any
reasonable restraint on alienation. 7 The latitude that state law provides is subject to
an important qualification. The courts generally have interpreted restraints on
Brower Mfg. Co., 27 Ill. App. 3d 963, 327 N.E.2d 468 (1975); Thompson v. Anderson, 209 Kan. 547, 498 P.2d I
(1972); Guaranty Laundry Co. v. Pulliam, 198 Okla. 667, 181 P.2d 1007 (1947); Rafe v. Hindin, 29 A.D.2d 481, 288
N.Y.S.2d 662 (1968).
5. See, e.g., Hodges v.Pittman, 384 So. 2d 14 (Ala. 1980) (buy-sell agreement upheld because, among other
things, the agreement was signed by all of the shareholders, the restrictive provisions were placed on the certificates, and
the restraints themselves were reasonable); In re Estate of Hatfield, 93 Misc. 2d 472,403 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1978) (restrictive
provision contained in articles of incorporation and noted on share certificates controlled over a provision in a
shareholder-decedent will); Monitor, Inc. v. Hetrick, 76 Cal. App. 3d 912, 141 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1978) (corporate bylaw
provision restricting transfer of shares applied to a division of community property upon divorce); Ginter v. Palmer & Co.,
566 P.2d 1358 (Colo. App. 1977) (provision giving corporation, on the death of shareholder, the option to purchase his
shares at book value as of the date of death controlled over provision in decendent's will transferring shares to devisee);
Levey v. Saphier, 54 A.D.2d 959, 388 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (restraint on alienation of shares is enforceable if
it effectuates a lawful purpose, is reasonable, and is in accord with public policy); Yeng Sue Chow v. Levi Strauss & Co.,
49 Cal. App. 3d 315, 122 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1975) (employee share purchase plan which gave the corporation a repurchase
option on the death of the employee-shareholder upheld with court holding that the mere fact that the value of the property
had changed since contract was concluded would not warrant a refusal to carry out its terms in the absence of
circumstances indicating fraud or bad faith); Ryan v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 453 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1971) (regardless
of corporate policy underlying the initial use of an option agreement, the agreement would be unenforceable under New
York law only if it prevented transfer of the shares, as opposed to merely delaying transfer by giving the corporation a
right of first refusal). See also Fletcher, supra note I, § 4561.3 n.6.
6. See (I) UNiF. PARrTNEsnw Acr § 18(g), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969), which provides that "No person can become a
member of a partnership without the consent of all the partners." The Uniform Partnership Act has been adopted in every
state except Louisiana, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. (2) UNw. LTD. PARtNEasunp Acr
§ 2(l)(a)(X), 6 U.L.A. 559 (1969), which provides that a certificate of limited partnership must state, "The right, if
given, of a limited partner to substitute an assignee as contributor in his place, and the terms and conditions of the
substitution." This Uniform Act has been adopted in sixteen states and the Virgin Islands. (3) Ray. UNO'. LTD.
PARTnEatsmP Acr § 201(a)(7), 6 U.L.A. 1987 Pocket Part 249, which requires a certificate of limited partnership to set
forth, "any power of a limited partner to grant the right to become a limited partner to an assignee of any part of his
partnership interest, and the terms and conditions of the power." The Revised Uniform Act has been adopted in the
remaining thirty-four states. In 1985 the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act was amended by deleting the
requirement in § 201(a)(7). The official comment to the amended section notes that the change was made "in recognition
of the fact that the partnership agreement, not the certificate of limited partnership, has become the authoritative and
comprehensive document for most limited partnerships." Thus, it may fairly be assumed that the practice of allowing
limited partnerships to place restrictions upon the transferability of its partners' interests will continue.
7. The reasonableness of a restriction on alienation is a question of law for the courts to decide. See Palmer v.
Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951). Most courts will uphold a share transfer restriction, imposed by either the
issuer or a shareholder, unless the restriction unconditionally prohibits alienation or is otherwise unreasonable. A
commonly applied test of reasonableness is whether the purpose served by a restraint is important enough to justify
overriding the general policy against restraints on alienation. See, e.g., Fayard v. Fayard, 293 So. 2d 421 (Miss. 1974).
In Fayard, the restriction in question was a "consent restraint," which prohibited transfers without the permission of each
shareholder. The court concluded that such a restriction served no reasonable purpose as applied to transfers within the
family controlling the close corporation.
Today, restrictions are generally held valid unless they are indefinite, Hardin v. Rostenthal, 213 Ga. 319, 98 S.E.2d
901 (1957), or they violate a public policy with respect to matters other than restricting alienation. Quinn v. Stuart Lakes
Club, Inc., 80 A.D.2d 350,439 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1981). Taking advantage of this apparent latitude, issuers and shareholders
have put share transfer restrictions to a wide variety of uses. Permissive restriction statutes are particularly useful in the
context of a close corporation which might want to use transfer restrictions to, among other things, avoid the possible loss
of a corporation's Subchapter S status under the Internal Revenue Code, limit the total number of shareholders, create a
ready market for shares by guaranteeing their purchase by either other shareholders or the issuer, see, e.g., Application
of Sirotta, 117 Misc. 2d 1088, 460 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1983), or retain share ownership within a limited group of holders,
see, e.g., Remillong v. Schneider, 1895 N.W.2d 493 (N.D. 1971) (class of owners restricted to incorporators and their
families); Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951) (applying Missouri law, restricting class of owners to
employees of the issuer). A corporation with relatively few shareholders may also impose transfer restrictions to ensure
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alienation very narrowly8 and will not enforce them against persons who acquired
their securities without notice. 9 Federal law is in sharp contrast to this approach.
Judicial and administrative interpretations of the Securities Act of 193310 require
parties to certain securities transactions to use transfer restraints, establish the scope
and duration of the limitations, and make them enforceable irrespective of actual
knowledge. 1
The theory of the 1933 Act is that the proper governmental function in
connection with transactions in securities is to assist investors and prevent fraud by
requiring a disclosure to prospective purchasers of all material facts relative to an
offering.12 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) and the
that shareholders who wish to retire will be able to liquidate their investment without disrupting corporate affairs. It is not
surprising, therefor, that statutes governing stock transfer restrictions are sometimes included in state laws governing close
corporations. In fact, some states define a close corporation as one whose issued shares are subject to one or more
restrictions on transfer. See DEL. CODE AN. tit. 8, § 342(a)(2) (1983); KAN. STAT. AN. § 17-7202(a)(2) (1983).
8. See, e.g., Engel v. Teleprompter Corp., 703 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1983) (restriction effective when a shareholder
proposes to "sell or otherwise dispose of" shares not triggered by an indirect transfer); Durkee v. Durkee-Mower, Inc.,
384 Mass. 628, 428 N.E.2d 139 (Mass. 1981) (assignment of shares by order of the probate court pursuant to a divorce
decree not a "sale" within the scope of the applicable share transfer restriction); Stenehiem v. Sette, 240 N.W.2d 596
(N.D. 1976) (share transfer restrictions waived since they had been ignored repeatedly in connection with earlier transfers
of shares; court also relied on the early common-law rule that restrictions on the free marketability of securities are looked
on with disfavor); Estate of Riggs v. Midwest Steel & Iron Works, 36 Colo. App. 302, 540 P.2d 361 (1976) (restraint
on voluntary alienation does not apply to testamentary dispositions); Earthman's Inc. v. Earthman, 526 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1975) (share transfer restriction not enforceable against a former wife who had been awarded restricted shares
pursuant to a divorce decree); Thompson v. Anderson, 209 Kan. 547, 498 P.2d 1 (1972) (plaintiff estopped to enforce
restriction when he had previously attempted to avoid it); Remillong v. Schneider, 185 N.W.2d 493 (N.D. 1971) (transfer
restriction not enforceable between shareholders where purpose of restriction was to protect the corporation from outside
influence rather than to prohibit an unequal division of share ownership by the sale of shares by one shareholder to
another); Rafe v. Hindlin, 29 A.D. 481, 288 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1968); Vogel v. Melish, 46 Ill. App. 2d 465, 196 N.E.2d
402 (1964); Berkowitz v. Firestone, 192 So. 2d 298 (Fla. App. 1966); Globe Slicing Mach. Co. v. Hasner, 333 F.2d 413
(2d Cir. 1964). See generally 2 F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE COR'ORATIONS § 7.08 (1971).
9. See, e.g., Erlich v. Nyberg, 78 Il. App. 3d 500, 396 N.E.2d 1273 (1977) (transferee had actual knowledge
so could not assert bona fide purchaser status); Norman v. Jerich Corp., 262 Or. 259, 501 P.2d 305 (1972); Ling & Co.
v. Trinity Savings & Loan Ass'n, 482 S.W.2d 841 (rex. 1972); see also Stenehiem v. Sette, 240 N.W.2d 596 (N.D.
1976) (shareholder agreement restricting the transfer of stock found unenforceable where party to agreement permitted a
third party without actual knowledge of the restriction to change his position in reliance on the possiblity of purchasing
the unlegended certificates); cf. F.H.T., Inc. v. Feuercholm, 211 Neb. 860, 320 N.W.2d 772 (1982) (private shareholder
agreement to restrict transfer was binding on the parties even though the certificates did not have the restriction
conspicuously noted thereon).
The Uniform Commercial Code provides that unless noted conspicuously on the security a restriction on a transfer
imposed by the issuer even though otherwise lawful is ineffective except against a person with actual knowledge of it.
U.C.C. § 8-204 (1977). This section is effective in all states. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 7-8-204 (1975); ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.08.204 (1986); Asuz. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 47-8204 (1956); COLO. Rav. STAT. § 42a-8-204 (1973); DEL. CODE AN.
tit. 6, § 8-204 (1983); HAw. REv. STAT. § 490:8-204 (1985); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 106, § 8-204 (Law. Co-op. 1979);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-8-204 (1972); MoNr. CODE ANN. § 30-8-204 (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-204 (1986); OKLA.
STAT. AN. tit. 12A, § 8-204 (West Supp. 1988); S.D. CODnt.D LAws AN. § 57A-8-204 (1980); VT. STAT. AN. tit. 9A,
§ 8-204 (1966); VA. CODE AN. § 18.8-204 (Supp. 1987). This provision was not intended to deal with restrictions
imposed by statute or by private agreements among shareholders. Official Comment 6 to U.C.C. § 8-204 (1977).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1982) [hereinafter the 1933 Act or the Act].
11. Certain resale restraints that are based on adminstrative interpretations of § 4(1) might not be communicated
to or known by a securityholder. See infra text accompanying notes 121-31. A person who does not comply with federal
restraints in connection with resales of his securities runs the risk of administrative sanctions and a private action for
damages by his purchaser under § 12(1) of the Act if he is unable to prove that he did not violate the registration
requirements. Section 12(l) is essentially a strict liability provision. A plaintiff is not required to prove scienter, or even
negligence, on the part of a defendant. Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 1973); Gridley v. Sayre
& Fisher Co., 409 F. Supp. 1266, 1272 (S.D.S.D. 1976).
12. See generally H.R. RaP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933); Report of the Advisory Committee on
Corporate Disclosure, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 1, Ch. XIX; (Comm. Print 95-29, 1977); SEC Disclosure Group,
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courts have determined that in certain instances the legislative goal of investor
protection, as embodied in specific regulations, justifies mandatory transfer restric-
tions. This policy has a dramatic impact on persons wishing to resell unregistered
securities. It has yielded a variety of resale limitations that are triggered by either the
nature of the person attempting to resell (i.e., an affiliate of the issuer)13 or the nature
of the transaction in which the holder acquired the securities. Individual resales can
be subject to one or more of the following limitations: 14 (1) holding period: A holder
may be prohibited from reselling certain securities until they have been beneficially
owned for a prescribed period of time;15 (2) location of sales: Resales might be
confined to residents of a particular geographical area, such as a single state or any
place outside the United States; 16 (3) manner of sale: A would-be seller might be
required to resell in brokers' transactions' 7 or be limited to privately negotiated
arrangements;1 8 (4) volume: A quantitative limitation might restrict the amount of
securities that are eligible for resale within a fixed period of time;19 and (5)
availability of information: The ability to resell in a retail market might depend upon
whether the issuer has made publicly available certain specified information. 20
Regardless of how beneficial these resale limitations might be in furthering the
objectives that Congress set in 1933, the costs associated with them are not
insignificant. In addition to the institutional burdens and expenses that are necessarily
involved in the implementation of any federal policy on transfer restrictions, this form
of regulation creates private costs for the issuer, the securityholder, and professional
participants in the capital market. An issuer hoping to acquire capital or other
business assets through the sale of its securities will find that transfer restrictions
reduce the value of the investment product being offered. An issuer will be forced to
compensate prospective buyers for this unattractive characteristic through a lower
offering price, 21 higher dividend or interest rates, or an investment contract sweetener
such as a conversion feature or a warrant. 22 Even if an issue of restricted securities
is successfully placed, the presence of securityholders with resale limitations creates
Disclosure to Investors: A Reappraisal of Federal Administrative Policies Under the '33 and '34 Acts, 10 (1969)
[hereinafter Wheat Report]; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 142-46.
14. A less intrusive limitation on resales not included in the text awaits certain securityholders who resell pursuant
to 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1987), which is discussed infra text accompanying notes 113-20. If the securities to be sold
exceed 500 shares or if the aggregate selling price of the securities will exceed $10,000, a notice of the sale must be filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") concurrently with the sale. Rule 144(h).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 79-90.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 91-104.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 113-20.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 137-41.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 113-20; 126-36.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 113-20; 137-41.
21. For a discussion of the factors that enter into the valuation of securities that are not freely tradeable, see
Levenson, Investment Companies and the Private Placement of Securities, in PLI, Fmsr ANNUM. INamrrrra ON SEcuRvan
REGULATION, 89, 98-100 (R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer & D. Glazer eds. 1970).
22. See Hearings on Capital Formation 1978-1980 Before the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 95th
& 96th Congress, Part 3, 593-94 (1978-80) for a summary of testimony by SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams. The
Commissioner also reported that resale limitations create (1) "difficulty ... by issuers in accomplishing new offerings
to raise equity capital, thus compounding capitalization problems due to the necessity of repeatedly reverting to debt to
satisfy cash needs" and (2) "a higher probability of take-over or mergers as insiders seek to exchange their shares for
those of a larger company to obtain liquidity." Id.
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monitoring costs for the issuer and its legal counsel.23 An investor who holds
securities that are not freely transferable also assumes additional risks and burdens.24
He loses the full range of opportunities that market liquidity provides to a security
owner whose circumstances or investment needs have changed. He cannot as easily
dissociate himself from an issuer if for any reason he becomes dissatisfied with its
management. Where an owner is foreclosed from the retail market and shunted into
private transactions, he is likely to encounter a smaller number of potential purchasers
and a lower sale price.25 Finally, resale restrictions saddle members of the securities
industry with related costs. For an investment banking firm raising capital for an
issuer, transfer restrictions on the securities being offered shrink the pool of available
investors and make it more difficult to market the issue. Significant amounts of
securities that carry a holding period requirement constitute an overhang on the
market in that class of security and, therefore, represent for securities dealers a
potentially disruptive force. Even a broker who executes sales for a customer assumes
added responsibilities when the securities he trades are not freely transferable.2 6
Despite recent modifications 27 the present federal policy of resale limitations
continues to impose unnecessary transaction costs. The purpose of this Article is
two-fold: to elucidate and explore the theoretical basis for such limitations and to
suggest a rationale for reform. It proceeds on the assumption that the federal
securities law restricting rights of alienation is a permissible restraint upon an owner's
property rights.28 It also assumes that an efficient policy in this area is not one that
maximizes public protection on the one hand or securityholder freedom on the other
but one that mediates between these goals in a fashion that minimizes the costs of
23. Where a resale limitation is a prerequisite to an issuer's transactional exemption, the issuer has the burden of
demonstrating compliance as to the entire transaction, a process that might last for an extended period of time. See infra
text accompanying notes 73-75. For an indication of the nature of an issuer's policing duties in the context ofa nonpublic
offering under § 4(2), see SEC Securities Act Release No. 5121 [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,943 (Dec. 30, 1970), where the Commission discussed the use of legends and stop-transfer instructions.
24. Institutional investors in private placements are especially burdened. See, e.g., SEC Poised to Loosen Private
Placement Trading Rules, Irvsmtr DEALEns' DiEesT, September 29, 1986, at 12:
A few Street firms set up special groups last year to try to trade privately-placed securities, but their efforts in
the past have been hindered by a mire of SEC regulations. The rules are designed, in part, to ensure that private
placements-which don't have to be filed for SEC perusal-don't end up being sold to unsophisticated
investors.
Generally, institutional investors in private placements have to sign a number of documents agreeing not
to resell or make some other kind of distribution of the securities for a certain length of time. Although there
are ways to get around some of the restrictions, resale still involves a myriad of paperwork. And in many cases,
the institution could be open to possible SEC enforcement action under different aspects of the securities laws.
An assessment of the economic plight of a securityholder with restricted securities should not include double-counting.
If a holder bargained for a reduced purchase price or other compensating benefit in return for the securities that he cannot
freely trade, he is not entitled to sympathy. However, even in this instance a holder might encounter resale burdens for
which he was not compensated. As the infra text accompanying notes 113-41 indicates, some resale limitations do not
originate with the issuer or other transferor and some restraints might not be open to bargain. See, e.g., the transfers that
are discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 121-25.
25. See generally Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 263-65
(1967).
26. See generally 7C J.W. IcKs, EXFMP-E TRANsACrIONS UNDER THE SEc-rrms AcT oF 1933, ch. 13 (1988 rev.)
[hereinafter J.W. HicKs].
27. The most dramatic changes involve liberalization of volume limitations under rule 144(e) and the termination
of certain restrictions on resales by nonaffiliates under rule 144(k). See infra notes 113-20.
28. See generally Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLuM L. REy. 931,
951-53 (1985); Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUm. L. REv. 970, 973-78 (1985).
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liquidating an investment. 29 Finally, it assumes that an efficient policy is multidi-
mensional, carefully attuned to the various forms of financing and liquidation and to
the different levels of investor sophistication, clearly definable in a manner that
allows affected persons to identify and reduce risks, and easily adaptable to
fluctuations in market conditions and to changes in law.
This Article asserts that any effort to enforce or to liberalize the 1933 Act resale
limitations must take into account the "transaction" concept which is at the heart of
the registration and prospectus delivery requirements of the Act. Part II of the Article
explains the significance of that concept and discusses its relationship to resale
limitations. Part I explores some of the analytical problems that are created when
courts and the SEC lose sight of this relationship. Finally, Part IV considers some of
the practical implications of the thesis for courts and policymakers charged with
enforcing, revising, or eliminating a particular resale limitation.
II. THE TRANSAcrION CONCEPT
A. Securities Transactions in General: An Overview of the Act
In ordinary parlance a transaction is simply the performance of one or more acts.
For those in the commercial world it is a business deal. A transaction involving a
security can range from an offer and sale of a single security to a series of offers and
sales in an underwritten public securities offering. As used in this sense, the term
transaction fails to capture the special nuances that are needed to understand resale
limitations under federal securities laws.30 But the nontechnical definition remains
useful. Despite the imprecision, it accurately conveys the scope of the registration
and prospectus delivery obligations of the 1933 Act.
Section 5 of the Act31 implements one of the two major purposes for the
statute.3 2 It protects prospective purchasers of securities by providing them "full and
fair disclosure of the character of securities" to be sold.3 3 The registration procedure
contemplated by section 5 calls for the filing of a registration statement (including a
disclosure document referred to as a "prospectus")34 with the SEC, the review of the
filed materials by the SEC staff, and the correction of all deficiencies in the
documents by the registrant prior to the effective date of the registration statement.35
Section 5 also contemplates that a copy of the prospectus be given to each investor
29. This principle is an adaptation of a normative statement by Richard A. Posner that he made with respect to
corporation law and creditor protection. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. On. L. Rsv.
499, 509 (1976).
30. A discussion of the technical meaning that the term "transaction" has under the Act is contained infra in the text
accompanying notes 63-76.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1981).
32. The preamble to the Act states: "An Act. To provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold
in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other
purposes." Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, § 1, 48 Stat. 74, c. 38 (1933).
33. Id.
34. "Registration statement" is defined in § 2(8). 15 U.S.C. § 77b(8) (1981). "Prospectus" is defined in § 2(10).
15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1981).
35. The procedure for filing a registration statement is set forth in § 6 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1981).
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prior to sale, or in some cases, at the time of delivery of the security after sale. 36
However, these obligations were not intended to reach every securities transaction.
The legislative relief came in the form of exemptions that are set forth in sections 3
and 4.37 Of particular importance to this Article are those exemptions designed for
certain "transactions. ' 38 Before turning to the word as a term of art, a further
preliminary issue must be resolved. Who is subject to the registration requirements?
The Securities Act of 1933 reflects a distinction Congress made between two
extreme forms of securities transactions. At one terminus is the full-scale public
distribution of a substantial block of securities that is underwritten and orchestrated
by investment bankers and carried to fruition by a select group of broker-dealers. The
pressures of solicitations, recommendations, and other sales activity accompanying
such an offering of securities can force members of the public into imprudent or
improvident investment decisions that are made without the benefit of accurate
information concerning the issuer, its management, and the realities of its immediate
future. In the opinion of Congress, prospective investors who are confronted with
these pressures deserve the special protections that are provided by the registration
and prospectus delivery requirements of the Act. The second extreme is the routine
sale of a few securities by a person who commands no influence or control over the
issuer of the securities he sells. Ordinary trading by individual investors is devoid of
the promotional pressures that characterize a public offering. Consequently, the
justification for imposing the registration burdens of the Act on the seller does not
arise. The distinction between distribution of securities and trading in securities, as
just described, is admittedly imprecise, but is nonetheless useful. For even in its
grossest form the distinction explains the interrelationship of sections 5, 4(1), and
2(11), and, in turn, explains the presence of the other transactional exemptions under
the Act.
The regulatory net of section 5 reaches far afield. The obligations of that
statutory provision apply to "any person" who uses the mails or other channels of
interstate commerce to offer "or" sell or "to" buy a security, to sell a security, or
to deliver a security after sale. Without the presence of a qualifying provision, section
5 would encompass all securities transactions by "any person," 39 from an under-
written public offering to an ordinary trade of a single security. However, section 4(1)
36. The prospectus-delivery requirements are a function of exceptions set forth in § 4(3) of the Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(3) (1981).
37. 15 U.S.C. 33 77c & d (1981).
38. Although the statutory heading for § 3 is "Exempted Securities," only securities covered by §§ 3(a)(2) through
3(a)(8) are accorded the privileges of exempted securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(2)-(8) (1981). These exemptions turn on the
intrinsic nature of the issuer or the character of the security itself which, in turn, justifies the belief that further
governmental regulation would be improper or superfluous. As a result, these exemptive provisions eliminate the need
to determine whether the exempted securities are being distributed or traded or whether the person selling them is an
issuer, underwriter, or dealer. See generally Throop & Lane, Some Problems of Exemption Under the Securities Act of
1933, 4 LAw & CoNEsT,. NOB. 89, 92-93 (1937).
In addition to enacting exemptions for certain classes of securities, Congress identified certain transactions which,
for a variety of reasons, it believed did not justify full and detailed compliance with § 5. Sections 3(a)(1), 3(a)(9),
3(a)(10), 3(a)(ll), 3(b), 3(c), and all of the subparagraphs of § 4 provide exemptions from the registration requirements
for the particular securities transactions. 15 U.S.C. §3 77c(a)(1), (9), (10) & (11), (b), & (c) & (d)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5),
& (6) (1981).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1981). The term person is broadly defined in 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1981).
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of the Act effects the distinction that Congress intended between distribution of
securities and trading in securities by removing the application of section 5 from any
securities transaction "by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.' 4
Stated differently, section 4(1) exempts all transactions except those by an issuer,
underwriter, or dealer.
To appreciate how section 4(1) preserves the desired goals of section 5 for a
distribution while it simultaneously bestows a freedom from registration for ordinary
trading, one must understand the exceptions included in section 4(1), especially the
term "underwriter," defined by section 2(11).41 In the process of understanding the
limitations expressly provided for in section 4(1), one will also acquire an
appreciation for the need that certain persons have to investigate the strengths and
weaknesses of other exemptions under the Act. The following analysis of section 4(1)
is designed to produce both insights. It is organized in terms of these categories of
possible sellers of unregistered securities: (1) the issuer; (2) a person in a control
relationship with the issuer (affiliate of an issuer); (3) a person who does not enjoy
a controlling influence upon the issuer (nonaffiliate); and (4) a person who is engaged
in the business of buying or selling securities as agent or principal (a broker-dealer).
1. Issuer
The first exception from the section 4(1) exemption is any transaction "by...
an issuer." 42 An issuer, as the source of securities, is more likely to distribute its
securities to the public, directly or indirectly, and less likely to trade in those
securities as an ordinary investor. Consequently, transactions by an issuer do not
need, nor do they qualify for, the exemption designed for trading. If an issuer wishes
to sell unregistered securities, it must rely upon an exemption other than section 4(1).
Possible exemption candidates are sections 3(a)(9), 3(a)(10) and 3(a)(11), Regula-
tions A43 and D44 under section 3(b), and sections 4(2) and 4(6).
2. Affiliate of Issuer
The policy of the Act, as implemented by section 5, is to provide for "full
disclosure of every essentially important element" pertaining to a distribution of
securities. 45 This policy is equally applicable to the distribution of a new issue and to
40. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l) (1981).
41. Section 2(11) states:
The term "underwriter" means any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells
for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect
participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting
of any such undertaking; but such term shall not include a person whose interest is limited to a commission from
an underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual and customary distributors' or sellers' commission. As used
in this paragraph the term "issuer" shall include, in addition to an issuer, any person directly or indirectly
controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common control with the issuer.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1981).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l) (1981). "Issuer" is defined by § 2(4) to include "every person who issues or proposes to
issue any security." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1981).
43. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-261 (1987).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-505 (1987).
45. Report of Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1933).
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a subsequent redistribution of securities that are issued and outstanding. The
following excerpt from the House report on the bill that eventually became part of the
Act, as adopted, explains the legislative decision for requiring registration in
connection with so-called secondary distributions through underwriters by controlling
security holders (affiliates). 46
All the outstanding stock of particular corporation may be owned by one individual or a
select group of individuals. At some future date they may wish to dispose of their holdings
and to make an offer of this stock to the public. Such a public offering may possess all the
dangers attendant upon a new offering of securities. Wherever such a distribution reaches
significant proportions, the distributor would be in the position of controlling the issuer and
thus able to furnish the information demanded by the bill. This being so, the distributor is
treated as equivalent to the original issuer and if he seeks to dispose of the issuer through a
public offering, he becomes subject to the act.47
Having decided to subject an affiliate to the registration requirements of the Act,
Congress had to translate the policy decision into the language of the statute. Instead
of employing restrictions directly applicable to affiliates, Congress opted for a
regulatory scheme that affected all distributions, including those effected by
affiliates. This indirect control of affiliates is reflected in the operation of sections 5,
4(1), and 2(11) of the Act. Section 5, it should be recalled, applies to the offer and
sale of a security by "any person." 48 Section 4(1), on the other hand, provides an
exemption from section 5, but only to transactions by "any person other than an...
underwriter. ' 49 The term "underwriter," as used in section 4(1), is defined by
section 2(11) of the Act as "any person who ... sells for an issuer in connection with
the distribution of any security.... As used in this paragraph the term "issuer" shall
include . . . any person . . . controlling . . . the issuer.''50
Whenever an affiliate's sales reach the "significant proportions" referred to in
the legislative history of the Act, 51 the transaction is deemed to involve a distribution
for purposes of section 2(11). Any broker-dealer or other person who assists an
affiliate in a distribution becomes an "underwriter" since he is one who "sells for an
issuer" (a term that is equated with the term affiliate for purposes of section 2(11))
"in connection with the distribution of any security. "52 As a result of the underwriter
status of those persons who assist him in the public offering, the affiliate himself, as
a person who is "engaged in steps necessary to the distribution of security issues," 5 3
is denied the benefit of a section 4(1) exemption even though he might not fall within
the section 2(11) definition. An affiliate who is either an underwriter or plays an
essential role in the distribution of a security issue is foreclosed from claiming a
46. The term "affiliate" as defined by the SEC in 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1987) includes a person who directly or
indirectly controls the issuer. For a detailed discussion of the concept, see infra text accompanying notes 272-94.
47. H.R. RaP. No. 85, supra note 45, at 13-14.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1981).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1981).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1981), supra note 41.
51. H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 45, at 13-14.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1981).
53. SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benevolent Ass'n, 39 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), rev'd, 120 F.2d 738, 741 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941), discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 65-72.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
section 4(1) exemption and must either register his securities or look elsewhere in the
Act for a possible exemption.
A logical but misleading inference can be drawn from the foregoing analysis of
sections 4(1) and 2(11), as applied to affiliates. Where the securities in an affiliate's
transaction do not reach significant proportions, a distribution, as interpreted for
purposes of section 2(11), would be deemed to be nonexistent. Without a distribu-
tion, no one, including an affiliate, can become an underwriter.5 4 Therefore, one
might conclude, section 4(1) is always available under such circumstances.
The problem with this conclusion is that it fails to account for the difference that
exists under the Act between restricted and unrestricted securities. It also ignores the
possiblity that recent sales of securities by persons closely related to the affiliate will
be attributed to him and will thereby increase his volume of securities to significant
proportions. Assuming, however, that no sales are attributable to an affiliate who
intends to rely upon section 4(1) for the sale of an insignificant amount of securities,
the exemption is available, but only if the securities are unrestricted. If the securities
in the transaction are restricted, section 2(11) reemerges as a possible bar to a section
4(1) exemption, thereby forcing the seller to consider Rule 144 5 and other alternative
exemptions.
3. Nonaffiliate of Issuer
A nonaffiliate, by definition, is a person who does not possess the power to
direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of an issuer of
securities. 56 As a noncontrolling person, he is unlikely to qualify as an underwriter
within the meaning of section 2(11) when he sells unregistered securites in ordinary
brokerage transactions or in privately negotiated sales. In such transactions, neither
the broker-dealer nor the purchaser who is involved in the nonaffiliate's transaction
would be selling for or buying from an issuer (i.e., control person) for purposes of
section 2(11). As a result, in most situations, a nonaffiliate's sales of securities can
be properly described as trading, the type of transaction section 4(1) permits without
the use of a prospectus. The kind of transaction that creates difficulties under section
4(1) for a nonaffiliate is the offer and sale of so-called "restricted" securities. The
concept of restricted securities grows out of the basic distinction in the Act between
a distribution and a trade.
Primary and secondary distributions of unregistered securities can be effected in
a variety of ways. The issuer or major securityholder who makes a public offering
might utilize the special skills of an investment banker or a broker-dealer who will
either purchase the securities as principal for resale at a profit or will market the
securities for the seller as agent for a commission or fee. In either case, the
54. "Underwriter," as defined by § 2(11) of the Act, includes any person who is purchasing with a view to, or
offering or selling in connection with "the distribution of any security" or who has a direct or indirect participation in
"any such undertaking," i.e., "distribution." Supra note 41.
55. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1987). For an overview of rule 144, see Steinberg & Kempler, The Application and
Effectiveness of SEC Rule 144, 49 Omo STATE L.J. 473 (1988).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405, defines "affiliate." See infra text accompanying notes 283-94.
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professional participant in the distribution qualifies as an underwriter under section
2(11). The activities performed by an investment banker or broker-dealer might also
be rendered by one or more nonprofessionals. In order to prevent issuers or affiliates
of issuers from circumventing the requirements of section 5 by distributing unreg-
istered securities through nonprofessionals, Congress defined "underwriter" to
include "any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to . . . the
distribution of any security."157 The SEC has emphasized the importance of this
phrase in section 2(11) by defining as "restricted securities" any securities acquired
directly or indirectly from the issuer or an affiliate of that issuer in a transaction not
involving a public offering. 58 To protect investors against an indirect distribution, the
Commission requires the owner of restricted securities to hold them for an appropriate
length of time and then to resell them in such limited quantities and in such a manner
as not to disrupt the trading markets. 59
4. Broker-Dealer
Any person who is engaged either for all or a significant part of his time, as
agent or principal, in the business of buying, selling, or otherwise trading in securities
is defined by the Act as a "dealer.' ' 6 An important question faced by Congress in
1933 was whether to subject a dealer to the registration requirements of the Act for
every one of the countless transactions he effects on a daily basis in his business.
A dealer is, by occupation, a natural link in the chain of transactions through
which securities move from an issuer or an affiliate of an issuer to the public. Where
a distribution is made pursuant to an effective registration statement, dealers are a
logical choice for assisting in the delivery of prospectuses. Where a distribution
involves sales of unregistered securities in violation of section 5, some dealers will
find themselves, wittingly or unwittingly, playing a key role as participants in a
public offering. If dealers are to share in the duties of delivering prospectuses and if
the exemption in section 4(1) is to be preserved for ordinary trading, transactions by
dealers require special regulation. These legislative judgments are reflected in the
specific exception in section 4(1), which removes the exemption from any transaction
by a dealer, 61 and in sections 4(3) and 4(4), which are technical exemptions tailored
especially to the realities of the securities markets and the objectives of section 5.62
The preceding discussion contains a potential red herring. By focusing on
persons who are subject to the registration requirements of the Act, the survey might
create an impression that the exemptive provisions are tailored to categories of
prospective sellers and that, therefore, it is the person who is exempted. While it is
true the exemptions are designed for particular persons they are applicable only to
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1981).
58. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3) (1987).
59. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1987). For a discussion of rule 144, see infra text accompanying notes 113-20.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(12) (1981).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1981).
62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(3) & (4) (1981). See generally 7X J.W. HAcKs, supra note 26, Chs. 12 & 13.
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transactions. It is for this reason that the term transaction warrants particular
attention.
B. Transaction: The Technical Meaning
A transaction is not subject to section 5 if it qualifies for one of the exemptions
under sections 3 or 4.63 The issue then, for a prospective seller, is to determine the
specific activities that must be tested against the requirements of a possible
transactional exemption. Despite the relevance of the term to the regulatory scheme,
neither the Act nor any administrative rule defines it.64 One possible inference that
can be drawn from the absence of a definition is that for both Congress and the SEC
the term has no special meaning. The decision by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in SEC v. Chinese Consolidated Association65 laid to rest any such notion.
The Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association was a New York corporation
organized for benevolent and patriotic purposes, with a membership of approximately
25,000 Chinese persons. On September 1, 1937, the government of the Republic of
China authorized the issuance of $500 million in four percent Liberty Bonds; on May
1, 1938, the Republic of China authorized the issuance of $50 million in five percent
U.S. Dollar Bonds. In October 1937, the Association established a General Relief
Fund Committee which had no official or contractual connection with the government
of China or any branch thereof, to solicit and receive funds from members of the
Chinese communities in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut and from the
general public in those states, for transmittal to China for general relief purposes. The
Committee proceeded to advertise the sale, 66 collect funds, and transmit the payments
(approximately $600,000) to the Bank of China in New York, which then transmitted
the funds to its branch in Hong Kong with instructions to make purchases for the
account of the various customers. The Hong Kong bank returned the bonds by mail
to the New York agency of the Bank of China, which in turn forwarded the bonds by
mail to the purchasers at their mailing addresses. In some instances, the address given
by individual purchasers was the Association. In those situations, the New York
branch of the Bank of China sent the bonds to the individual purchaser in care of the
Association. The members of the Committee received no compensation, either from
63. See supra note 38.
64. The efforts by the SEC to provide issuers with objective criteria or safe harbor rules for avoiding integration
of offers or sales do not represent a definition of "transaction." See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(b), 230.152 &
230.502(a) (1987); SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961), 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2270, 2272 at
2608. These administrative pronouncements are intended to indicate when offers or sales by an issuer, preceding,
accompanying, or following an offering allegedly for a separate purpose, will not be integrated with that offering. They
do not address the issue of when each of the separate offerings commences or terminates. For a discussion of the doctrine
of integration, see, e.g., R. JreNuos & H. MARsH, SEcusrnms REGuLATnoN, CAsEs AND MATERtAuS 440-44 (6th ed.
Foundation 1987); American Bar Association, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Integration of Securities
Offerings: Report of the Task Force on Integration, 42 Bus. LAw 595 (1986); Shapiro & Sachs, Integration Under the
Securities Act: Once an Exemption, Not Always ... , 31 MD. L. REv. 3 (1971).
65. 120 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
66. The Committee used mass meetings, advertising in newspapers distributed through the malls, and personal
appeals to urge the members of Chinese communities in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut to purchase the Chinese
government bonds, and offered to accept funds from prospective purchasers for delivery to the Bank of China in New
York as agent for the purchasers. 120 F.2d 738, 739 (2d Cir. 1941).
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the persons who transmitted money or from the Bank of China, the Chinese
government, or from any other source in connection with its activities. No
registration statement was filed for any of the Chinese bonds advertised through the
mails for sale. On June 12, 1940, the SEC filed a civil suit against the Association
to enjoin it from selling unregistered bonds in violation of the Securities Act of 1933.
The Commission contended that by advertising the bond offering, and soliciting
purchases and receiving funds from the individual purchasers, the Association was
selling securities in violation of section 5. The District Court for the Southern District
of New York rejected the SEC's request for an injunction and granted the
Association's motion for judgment on the pleadings. It found that the Association was
not an agent of the issuer, the Republic of China, and therefore, was not an
underwriter for the issuer.67
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a majority opinion written by
Augustus Hand, reversed the lower court, concluding that the Association was a
section 2(11) underwriter. 68 In acceding to the Commission's request for injunctive
relief, the court fashioned an alternative theory for withholding the section 4(1)
exemption from the defendant. 69 The court concluded: "Even if the defendant is not
itself an issuer, underwriter, or dealer, it was participating in a transaction with an
issuer, to wit, the Chinese Government." 70 In explaining its construction of section
67. 39 F. Supp. 85, 89 (1940).
68. 120 F.2d 738, 741 (1941).
69. Judge Hand's alternative grounds for denying the Association a § 4(1) exemption-its significant particpation
in the issuer's violation of § 5-was forcefully advanced by the SEC in its brief to the court. The major thrust of the
Commission's suit against the Association was that § 4(l), by its terms, offered two reasons for excluding the defendant's
activities: (1) the admitted facts disclosed a "transaction by an issuer [i.e., the Republic of China]," and (2) the defendant
was an underwriter. The Commission explained the first of these two reasons, in part:
As pointed out above, the purpose of Section 4(1) is to exempt ordinary trading transactions, not distributions.
To achieve this purpose, the section excludes from the exemption transactions by an issuer.
The issuer in this case is the Republic of China. Each completed transaction in the distribution of the
Chinese bonds includes: a solicitation by the defendant of an offer to buy; an offer to buy made by an individual
purchaser, and the acceptance of that offer by the Chinese Government. There is no separate and distinct
transaction carried through by the defendant; its solicitation merely initiates a transaction to be completed by the
Republic of China. Since each completed transaction is one effected by an issuer, the transaction is not exempt
under Section 4(1) of the Act.
The defendant argues that it is not itself an issuer or an underwriter and that, therefore, Section 4(1)
exempts its solicitation of offers to buy. This argument assumes that the exemption applies to component parts
of a single transaction, while excluding other parts. There is no support for this position in the statute. On the
contrary, the Act prohibits "sales" (which as defined include solicitations of offers to buy) in all transactions
by an issuer regardless of the character of person making the solicitation. If Congress had intended to exempt
all persons other than issuers, underwriters, or dealers regardless of their participation in a transaction by an
issuer, it seems that it would have been simple to reach this result by drafting Section 4(1) to read:
"The provisions of Section 5 shall not apply to any of the following persons:
(1) Persons other than issuers, underwriters, or dealers."
Congress carefully distinguished between the terms "classes of securities," "transactions," and
"persons," as is evidenced by Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the Act. It therefore obviously intended to exempt
"transactions," rather than "persons," when it used the word "transaction" in Section 4(1).
To interpret Section 4(1) as granting an exemption to this defendant would mean that the courts would be
powerless to restrict persons knowingly performing essential functions in the distribution of securities by an
issuer.
SEC Brief, SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benevolent Ass'n, supra note 65, at 15-16 [hereinafter SEC Chinese brief].
The Commission adhered to this same position in its brief in opposition to the Association's writ of certiorari to the
U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 7-9.
70. 120 F.2d 738, 741 (1941).
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4(1), the court responded to the Association's argument that Congress had carved out
only three exceptions to the general trading exemption and the category of
participants was not one of them.
The court began by noting that the transaction, initiated by the Republic of
China, needed an effective registration statement or an appropriate exemption other
than section 4(1) and that it embraced more than the actual sales of its securities. The
issuer's transaction included the solicitation of offers to buy, "the offers themselves,
the transmission of the offers and the purchase money through the banks to the
Chinese government, the acceptance by that government of the offers and the
delivery of the bonds to the purchaser or the defendant as his agent." The
Association's role in this transaction was significant. According to Judge Hand, the
Association participated in the unregistered distribution by soliciting orders, obtain-
ing the cash from the purchasers, and causing both to be forwarded to the issuer's
agents. Contrary to the Association's belief, the defendant's participation could not
be isolated from the entire transaction and, so separated, be given the protection of
section 4(1). As Judge Hand reasoned:
[The argument on behalf of the defendant incorrectly assumes that Section 4(1) applies
to the component parts of the entire transaction we have mentioned and thus exempts
defendant unless it is an underwriter for the Chinese Republic. Section 5(a)(1), however,
broadly prohibits sales of securities irrespective of the character of the person making them.
The exemption is limited to "transactions" by persons other than "issuers, underwriters or
dealers."-71 It does not in terms or by fair implication protect those who are engaged in steps
necessary to the distribution of security issues. To give Section 4(1) the construction urged
by the defendant would afford a ready method of thwarting the policy of the law and evading
its provisions.72
The interpretation of the term "transaction," as enunciated by the Second Circuit
in the Chinese Consolidated case, falls short of a formal definition. However, even
if the court had not been constrained by the particular facts and statutory provisions
in dispute, it could not have fashioned a construction that applies across the board.
It is an elusive concept that perhaps is definable only through its characteristics.
Judge Hand's opinion captured two of four key elements of the concept as it relates
to exemptions from the requirements of section 5. The other two elements follow
logically from them.
First, a transaction consists of more than the aggregate offers and sales of
securities. The scope of section 5 and the breadth of the terms "offer" and "sale,"
as defined in section 2(3) and as applicable to section 5, clearly demand regulations
that reach other activities as well. 73
Second, a transaction has a temporal dimension that is determined by the
exemption being invoked. Some sales are completed within minutes, while others
may extend over a period of days, months, or even years. However long it takes a
person to sell securities, he must comply with all of the terms and conditions of the
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id at 740.
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claimed exemption. The duration of any transaction is fixed by those prerequisites
and by the general purpose of the exemption. 74
Third, a transacton is indivisible. Offers and sales within the transaction may not
be separated so that some will meet the requirements of one particular exemption
while the others, which are ineligible for that exemption, are earmarked for another
exemption.7 5
Fourth, the quality of earlier and distinct transactions is immaterial. For
example, a person who has acquired securities in an exempted transaction may not
rely upon the exempt status of the earlier transaction to help him in a subsequent
resale. Similarly, a person who purchased securities sold pursuant to an effective
registration statement is not permitted to ignore the mandates of section 5 upon resale
on the grounds that his seller fully complied with the registration requirements of the
Act. In both situations, the investor's resale involves a separate transaction that must
either comply with the requirements of section 5 or be protected by an appropriate
exemption. Conversely, a person who has acquired securities from an issuer or a
securityholder who sold the securities to him in violation of section 5 is not treated
as an owner of "tainted" securities that can never be resold in compliance with the
Act. Assuming that he is not in a controlling relationship with the issuer, and does not
function as an underwriter, such a person is viewed as an independent participant in
the securities market and may resell the securities in a registered offering or in
reliance upon an appropriate exemption. 7
6
The second of these four characteristics-the duration of a transaction as
controlled by the conditions and purpose of an exemptive rule or provision-leads to
the topic of resale limitations.
C. The Relationship Between the Concept of Transaction and Resale Limitations
From the securityholder's perspective, resale limitations can arise either because
of the transaction in which the holder acquired his securities or because of the
transaction that he intends to initiate. In the first of these situations, the acquiring
transaction, resale limitations might exist because the transferor, either the issuer or
another securityholder, was not permitted legally to proceed with its transaction
unless it restricted the transferability and resale of the securities involved. Even where
the transferor was not obligated to restrict resales, a holder might discover resale
restrictions emerging from his acquiring transaction because of SEC policy that
addresses him but not his transferor. Resale limitations can also originate in
connection with a securityholder's transferring transaction. This problem is confined
to affiliates.
74. Id at 740-41. See also SEC v. Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147, 162 (1935), where the
Commission stated that "[t]he point at which such distribution is completed is a question of fact to be determined in the
light of all the circumstances of the offering."
75. For a discussion of the doctrine of integration, which is designed to prevent segmenting a single transaction,
see the authorities cited supra in note 64.
76. 7 J.W. Hicxs, supra note 26, § 1.101[3].
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The distinction between acquiring and transferring transactions provides a useful
framework for organizing resale limitations. As a person directly affected by resale
limitations, the securityholder has a major interest in policy determinations that
underlie restraints on his property rights. It seems appropriate, therefore, to approach
the topic from the holder's perspective. More importantly, the distinction brings into
sharper focus the relationship that exists between transactions and resale limitations.
Congress in 1933 did not construct a monolithic policy on secondary sales that might
explain the transfer restraints that are presently in place. It enacted a statute which,
as construed by courts and the SEC, has yielded a multiformity of limitations, with
each serving a different purpose. 77 Determining which, if any, of these restraints is
appropriate in a specific transaction depends on the objective of the statutorily based
regulations that govern that transaction. The use of resale limitations is confined
almost exclusively to unregistered offerings in which the seller must qualify his
transaction under one of the exemptive rules or provisions. 78 In these cases the
pertinent regulatory objective is found in the exemption that the seller claims. Thus,
the only way for one to assess the efficacy and validity of a particular resale limitation
is to trace it back to its originating transaction and to ask whether the limitation
contributes to the objective of the exemption that the seller invoked for that
transaction. The discussion that follows arranges resale limitations in terms of the two
types of originating transactions, aligns the limitations with the relevant exemptions,
and articulates the traditional justification for imposing restraints in particular
exempted transactions.
1. Acquiring Transactions
a. Issuer as Source of Limitations
A person who purchases securities in a registered public offering will not
discover resale restrictions imprinted on his stock certificate or other evidence of
ownership interest. He might receive this message, however, where the issuer
structures its transaction to qualify for a transactional exemption.
Issuer-initiated limitations can involve either a required holding period or a
prohibition on trading outside a prescribed geographic area. Holding period require-
ments attach to securities that are sold pursuant to private placements under section
4(2)79 or 4(6)80 or in limited offerings under rules 50481 or 50582 of Regulation D.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 14-20.
78. The discussion of resale limitations infra text accompanying notes 215-36 relates to registered offerings.
79. Rule 506 provides a safe harbor for issuers seeking to rely upon § 4(2). 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1987). It requires
that the issuer impose resale limitations. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b)(1) & 502(d) (1987).
80. Section 4(6) does not explicitly require a holding period but it achieves this result with the statutory language
which extends the exemption to offers and sales by an issuer "solely" to one or more accredited investors. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(6) (1981).
81. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504(b)(1) & 230.502(d) (1987). Rule 504(b)(1) dispenses with a holding period requirement
where an issuer's offers and sales are made exclusively in one or more states providing for registration and delivery of
a disclosure document. See generally 7A J.W. HicKs, supra note 26, § 7.05[3][e][ii].
82. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(1) & 230.502(d).
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As construed by the SEC, all of these securities are deemed to be restricted 83 and, if
they are to be resold in reliance upon that rule, must be beneficially owned for a
period of two years prior to resale. 84 The two-year holding period limitation is
predicated on the assumption that a purchaser in any of these transactions ought to be
at risk for a reasonable period of time before he can sell without registration. 85
However, the purpose it serves in these unregistered offerings is not the same.
Sections 4(2) and 4(6) provide transactional exemptions for an issuer that
confines its offers and sales to persons who because of sophistication, wealth, or
economic bargaining power do not need the benefits offered by registration. 86 In
either of these nonpublic offerings, the holding period requirement is designed to
prevent an allegedly private offering from spilling over to persons who need the
protections of registration and disclosure.
87
Unlike sections 4(2) and 4(6), the exemptions provided by rules 504 and 505
permit an issuer to offer its securities publicly without regard to the sophistication or
experience of potential investors. But some features of a public offering have been
eliminated. Section 3(b), which is the source for these exemptive rules, authorizes the
Commission to create additional transactions if it finds that registration is not
necessary for the protection of investors "by reason of the small amount involved or
the limited character of the public offering." 88 The limitations on resale, together
with the other conditions of rules 504 and 505, guarantee that the offerings retain the
"limited character" that the statute requires. In the case of rule 504 transactions, the
resale limitation and the prohibition on general advertising are the only checks on an
otherwise open invitation to small companies to raise a maximum of $500,000
without any disclosure obligations. 89 The condition in rule 505 relating to resales
ensures that the limitation on the number of purchasers in rule 505(b)(2)(ii) is
meaningful. 90
Limiting resales to a particular geographical area is part of an issuer's
obligations where it sells unregistered securities in an intrastate offering pursuant to
section 3(a)(1 1)91 or in a foreign offering in accordance with guidelines set forth in
SEC Release No. 4708.92 The intrastate exemption requires not only that the
securities be offered and sold in a single state, but also that they come to rest in the
hands of persons resident within the state. 93 Although intrastate trading among
83. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3) (1987); SEC Securities Act Release No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 83,106 at 84,921 (March 8, 1982) where the SEC characterizes securities acquired in a § 4(6)
transaction as restricted.
84. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1) (1987).
85. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,487 at
81,056 (January 11, 1972).
86. See generally 7C J.W. IIcKs, supra note 26, Chs. I1 & 15, respectively.
87. Release No. 5223, supra note 85, at 81,056-81,057; Release No. 5121, supra note 23, at 80,097.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1981).
89. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1) (1987) incorporates 17 C.F.R. 99 230.502(c) and (d).
90. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(1) (1987) incorporates 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (1987).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1981).
92. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4708 (July 9, 1964), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1361 [hereinafter Release
No. 47081.
93. Release No. 4434, supra note 64, T 2275 at 2610.
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residents is permitted, 94 it is the issuer's burden to prove that no reoffers or resales
to nonresidents take place until the entire issue comes to rest, a process that the SEC
has suggested could take a full year.95 As a practical matter, many issuers curtail any
trading within one year from the last sale by the issuer. 96 The ban on sales to
out-of-state persons is deemed necessary in order for the transaction to retain the local
character that Congress intended it to have.97 Foreign offerings present a similar
problem for the issuer.
In Release No. 4708 the SEC stated that it would not take any enforcement
action against a domestic issuer for failure to register its securities being offered and
sold abroad exclusively to foreign investors in a manner which would result in the
securities coming to rest abroad. 98 In order to guarantee that unregistered securities
sold to foreign investors do not prematurely flow back into this country, the issuer is
expected to impose restrictions on the subsequent transfer of those securities. 99
Relying on informal SEC staff guidelines,100 issuers prohibit for a period of ninety
days, measured from the end of the foreign offering, either transfers to any person,
94. Id.
95. Goldman, The Intrastate Offering, in New RaNDs AND SPECIAL PROBLE S uNDER r TE SECURMES LAw 173, 182
(A. Somner ed. 1970). Mr. Goldman was at the time an Associate Regional Administrator for the SEC. This one-year
measure of safety is also consistent with the one-year statute of limitation period in § 13 for instituting suits under the civil
liability provisions of § 12. 15 U.S.C. § 77m(1) (1981).
The one-year period was first suggested by the Commission in Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147, 163
(1935). See infra text accompanying note 263. In responding to requests for no-action letters, premised on § 3(a)(1 1), the
SEC has usually refused to express any view on whether securities have come to rest. See, e.g., Valient Steel & Equip.,
Inc., No-action letter from SEC (July 2, 1976), [1971-76] Wash. Serv. Bur. Microfiche, fiche 267, frame C6; Hynes &
Howes Mortgage Co., No-action letter from SEC (Dec. 1, 1972), [1971-76] Wash. Serv. Bur. Microfiche, fiche 258,
frame CIO.
Under the safe harbor rule for § 3(a)(11) interstate trading may commence nine months after the last sale by the
issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (1987). See infra text accompanying note 96.
96. The Commission addressed the problems inherent in intrastate trading that follow § 3(a)(1 1) issues in response
to a practice used by broker-dealers in Minnesota in 1961. Securities Act Release No. 4386, (1957-61 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 76,774 (July 12, 1961). According to the release, underwriters and participating dealers were
soliciting "indications of interest," which the SEC believed amounted to orders, from residents of the state during the
pendency of the registration application filed with state authorities. In most cases, the intrastate offerings were completely
sold on the date when the registration with the state became effective. Shortly, thereafter, trading was commenced in the
over-the-counter market. Many original purchasers sold at, or shortly thereafter, the commencement of trading and some
of the stock was acquired by nonresidents. Id. at 80,905. The Commission concluded that:
the quick commencement of trading and prompt resale of portions of the issue to non-residents raises a serious
question whether all of the issue has, in fact, come to rest in the hands of investors resident in the state of initial
offering. Where these practices are followed, it is likely that portions of the issue will be offered or sold to
non-residents through residents and dealers purchasing for resale and thus constitute elements of the distribution
to investors. If so, in view of the considerations outlined above, exemption under Section 3(a)(l1) is not
available and the entire issue will have been offered and sold in violation of the Securities Act. Such an illegal
distribution may not only subject the participants to enforcement action by the Commission, but subject them
also to civil liability for damages or rescission under Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 80,906.
97. Release No. 4434, supra note 64, at 2610.
98. Release No. 4708, supra note 92, 11362, at 2124. The Commission based this position on the definition of
interstate commerce in § 2(7) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(7) (1981). The release was in response to a Report of the
President of the United States from the Task Force on Promoting Increased Foreign Investment in the United States
Corporate Securities and Increased Foreign Financing for United States Corporations Operating Abroad (1964).
99. The Commission warned that the foreign offering "be effected in a manner which will result in the securities
coming to rest abroad." Release No. 4708, supra note 92, 1362, at 2124.
100. See, e.g., Fairchild Camera & Instrument Int'l Finance N.V., No-action letter from SEC (Nov. 15, 1976),
[1971-76] Wash. Serv. Bur. Microfiche, fiche 661, frame D9; Raymond Int'l Inc., No-action letter from SEC (May 28,
1976), [1971-76] Wash. Serv. Bur. Microfiche, fiche 659, frame B8; The Singer Co. Int'l, No-action letter from SEC
(August 2, 1974), [1971-76] Wash. Serv. Bur. Microfiche, fiche 646, frame Al.
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foreign or domestic, or, in some cases, transfers in the United States or to U.S.
persons. 101 In the Commission's opinion the registration requirements of the Act were
designed to assist American investors.' 0 2 Transfer restrictions on securities sold
abroad are necessary to ensure that the issuer's transaction does not include
"distribution or redistribution of the securities within, or to nationals of, the United
States.' 01 3 Where the issuer's transaction is restricted to foreign investors, the
Commission believes that no policy of the Act is compromised by relieving the issuer
of the burdens of registration. 104
b. Non-Issuer Transferor as Source of Limitations
Up to this point in the discussion of acquiring transactions the focus has been on
the issuer as seller. An affiliate or a nonaffiliate of an issuer can also impose resale
limitations as part of his transaction with another person.
Where an affiliate or a nonaffiliate acquires securities from an issuer in a
nonpublic offering, he holds securities that are restricted within the meaning of rule
144(a)(3).10 5 To avoid becoming a statutory underwriter when he transfers those
securities, the affiliate or nonaffiliate holder can resell under rule 144.106 Alterna-
tively, the restricted holder can transfer the restricted securities privately and require
of his transferee certain commitments as to when and how those securities are to be
resold or transferred.107 Where the private transfer takes the form of a sale the affiliate
or nonaffilate might claim the protection of the section 4(1-1/2) exemption.10 8
Whether or not the transfer is a sale, the transferor might inform the transferee
and the issuer that the securities will retain their restricted status, require the
transferee to notify the transferor prior to retransfer, or secure the transferor's
permission before attempting a retransfer. All of these limitations on resale appear to
have their origin in the transferring transaction because the affiliate or nonaffiliate
101. See, e.g., Evans, Offerings of Securities Solely to Foreign Investors, 40 Bus. LAW. 69, 70-76 (1984);
Tomlinson, Federal Regulation of Secondary Trading in Foreign Securities, 32 Bus. LAw. 463, 472-78 (1977).
102. Release No. 4708, supra note 92, 1362, at 2124.
103. Id. Where there is no danger of redistribution of securities within the United States, the SEC staff has permitted
immediate trading. See, e.g., College Retirement Equities Fund, No-Action Letter from SEC (Feb. 18,1987), [1987
Transfer Binder] (CCH) 78,420
104. Id. An entirely separate issue, not the subject of Release No. 4708, is the extent to which the anti-fraud
provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts apply extraterritorially. See generally Michaels, Subject Matter Jurisdiction over
Transnational Securitites Fraud, 71 CoRna.L L. REV. 919 (1986); R. Je;Nmcs & H. MARSH, supra note 64, at
1592-1603.
105. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3) (1987).
106. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(b) (1987).
107. Because the Commission is concerned that transfers without consideration might become part of a wider
distribution, it regulates resales by recipients under rule 144. See, e.g., Release No. 5223, supra note 85, at 81,058,
where the SEC explained the effect of 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e) (1987):
Amounts sold by a donee or trust, during any period of six months within two years after the acquisition of the
securities by the donee or trust, shall be aggregated with those sold by the donor or settlor. Amounts of securities
sold for the account of a pledgee or purchaser of pledged securities during any period of six months within two
years after a default in the obligation secured by the pledge, shall be aggregated with the amount of securities
sold by the pledgor. Since the donee, trust and pledgee stands in the "shoes" of the donor, settlor, and pledgor,
the former persons are subject to the latter persons' limitations under the rule. The purpose of limited
aggregation is consistent with the objectives of the Act, for otherwise a distribution or redistribution may be
effectuated by such means as gifts, pledges, and trusts.
108. For a description of this so-called exemption, see infra text accompanying notes 137-41.
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holder exercises individual control over the terms and conditions of the resale
restrictions. However, none of these resale limitations would be needed if the affiliate
or nonaffiliate holder were transferring unrestricted securities. It is because the issuer
sought to protect the exemptive quality of its transaction with the affiliate or
nonaffiliate holder that it restricted the transferability of the holder's securities. By
placing limitations on his transferee, the affiliate or nonaffiliate transferor is
discharging his responsibility to the issuer to make sure that his transfer will not
destroy the exemption for the original transaction.
A nonaffiliate holding unrestricted securities has no difficulty claiming an
exemption under section 4(1) and, therefore, is under no obligation to limit his
transferee's resale rights. 0 9 However, for reasons discussed in connection with
transferring transactions, 110 an affiliate planning to resell unrestricted securities
pursuant to the section 4(1-1/2) exemption, is required to limit his purchaser's
resales.' 11 Here, unlike transfers of restricted securities, the resale limitation cannot
be traced back to an earlier transaction. The affiliate transferor is the only source for
the holding period that his transferee must satisfy.1' 2
c. SEC Policy as Source of Limitations
Not all resale limitations that emerge from acquiring transactions are the result
of statutory or regulatory obligations imposed on the issuer or other transferor.
Administrative interpretations by the SEC and its staff, that are designed to further the
goals of the 1933 Act, account for many of the limitations on resale that
securityholders, as transferees, encounter.
The best known among the staff-created restrictions are found in rule 144. It
was designed to assist holders of restricted securities, whether affiliates or nonaffi-
liates, to resell publicly in reliance upon the section 4(1) trading exemption." 3 In the
course of clarifying when a transferee satisfies a holding period requirement that his
transferor has imposed in the original transaction," 4 the rule establishes several
additional limitations. In order to enjoy the benefits that rule 144 provides against the
possibility of a holder's resales being deemed a distribution and, therefore, of his
status changing to that of an underwriter, a prospective seller of restricted securities
109. See supra text acccompanying notes 56-59.
110. See infra text accompanying notes 142-46.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
112. See infra text accompanying note 146.
113. Release No. 5223, supra note 85, at 81,053-81,055. The rule was also designed to assist affiliates reselling
unrestricted securities. See infra text accompanying notes 242-43. Rule 144(j), which was added to the rule by a 1979
amendment, makes clear that the rule is nonexelusive. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6032 [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 81,992 at 81,500 (March 5, 1979). See generally 7B J.W. FHcKs, supra note 26, § 10.14. Despite
the presence of rule 144(j), many attorneys believe that the following statement, which was made by the Commission at
the time of the rule's adoption, continues to reflect enforcement policy:
[P]ersons who offer or sell restricted securities without complying with rule 144 are hereby put on notice by the
Commission that in view of the broad remedial purposes of the Act and of public policy which strongly supports
registration, they will have a substantial burden of proof in establishing that an exemption from registration is
available for such offers or sales and that such persons and the brokers and other persons who participate in the
transactions do so at their risk.
Release No. 5223, supra note 85, at 81,050.
114. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (1987).
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must be sure that all of these conditions are met: (i) the availability of adequate
current information about the issuer; 115 (ii) a limited volume of resales during a
three-month period;" 6 (iii) the use of brokerage transactions without any solicitation
by the holder of offers to buy and without any payment of extra commissions;" 17 and
(iv) a notice of sale to the Commission."18 The Commission stated at the time it
adopted rule 144 that these additional limitations on public resales of restricted
securities were needed because experience had demonstrated that the traditional
holding period requirement "has not assured adequate protection of investors through
the maintenance of informed trading markets and has led to uncertainty in the
application of the registration provisions of the Act."" 9 Nonetheless, the rule, as
amended, grants to nonaffiliate holders of restricted securities a dispensation from all
of these additional requirements provided the securities have been beneficially owned
by the person for a period of at least three years prior to their sale.' 20
The Commission has extended rule 144-type limitations to recipients who
would otherwise not be prohibited from reselling publicly. In each instance, the
circumstances surrounding the acquiring transaction are thought to justify the
limitations.
i. No-Sale Transfers
The registration requirements are premised on an offer to sell a security. Where
an issuer's securities transaction does not involve a sale it avoids registration and the
limitations associated with transactional exemptions.' 2' The same analysis holds true
for an affiliate's transaction. Faced with the prospect of large quantities of securities
flowing into the secondary markets without the type of disclosure that registration
would provide, the SEC has determined that the securities in certain non-sale
transactions might be deemed restricted in the hands of the original transferees. This
administrative policy could affect such recipients as an employee holding bonus or
gift securities from the issuer, 12 2 a pledgee of securities acquired from an affiliate
115. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) (1987).
116. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e) (1987). The volume standards in rule 144(e)(1) have been liberalized in a series of
amendments to the rule. See generally 7B J.W. HMcKs, supra note 26, § 10.09[4][d].
117. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(f) & (g) (1987).
118. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(h) (1987). The person filing a notice under rule 144(h) must have "a bona fide intention
to sell the securities referred to therein within a reasonable time after the filing of such notice." 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(i)
(1987).
119. Release No. 5223, supra note 85, at 81,053.
120. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(k) (1987). A 1983 amendment to rule 144 eliminated the requirement under rule 144(k)
that current information be publicly available with respect to an issuer of restricted securities. SEC Securities Act Release
No. 6488 [1983-84 Trasfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 83,429 (Sept. 23, 1983).
121. The registration requirements of § 5 are dependent upon an "offer" or "sale," 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1981), and
those terms require that an attempted disposition be "for value." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1981).
122. See, e.g., Dow Corning Corp., No-action letter from SEC (Aug. 23, 1976), [1971-76] Wash. Serv. Bur.
Microfiche, fiche 64 frame A12; Wetterau, Inc., No-action letter from SEC (Dec. 30, 1974), [1971-76] Wash. Serv. Bur.
Microfiche, fiche 144 frame C9. Where an issuer's securities are distributed to employees as part of an employee benefit
or award plan, the status of the securities under rule 144(a)(3) depends on several factors. See 7B J.W. HlcKs, supra note
26, §§ 10.05[3][b] & j].
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pledgor, 123 a trust or estate acquiring securities from an affiliate settlor or
decedent, 124 and recipients of securities spun off as a dividend in kind.' 25
ii. Presumptive Underwriters
Purchasers of large blocks of securities that are sold in registered primary or
secondary offerings might be subject to the disabilities of a statutory underwriter.
Under the so-called presumptive underwriter doctrine, 126 the SEC staff evaluates these
purchasers in terms of such other factors as: (i) the total number of securities being
sold, (ii) the number of securities being sold in relationship to the total amount of
securities not subject to trading restrictions (sometimes called the "float"), (iii) the
trading volume of that class of securities, and (iv) the nature of the issuer. 127 Depending
upon which factors it uses, the SEC staff will presume that these nonaffiliates, who
are frequently life insurance companies and other institutional investors, are under-
writers unless they resell in accordance with the volume limitations of rule 144.128
Although this doctrine is triggered by the amount of securities purchased in the
acquiring transaction, it is usually justified in terms of the impact that an unregulated
transferring transaction of this magnitude would otherwise have on ordinary trading
patterns in the secondary market. 129 The presumptive underwriter doctrine and anal-
ogous administrative attempts to control resales of unrestricted securities 130 can also
be seen as products of a broader policy that in administering and implementing the
123. See, e.g., Mary Moppet's Day Care Schools, No-action letter from SEC (Oct. 31, 1977), [1977] (CCH) Fed.
Sec. Microfiche, fiche 73, frame F5; See 7B J.W. HicKs, supra note 26, § 10.05[3][c].
124. See, e.g., Pneumatic Scale Corp., No-action letter from SEC (Jan. 29, 1975), [1971-76] Wash. Serv. Bur.
Microfiche, fiche 46, frame B2, [trust beneficiary]; Inland Steel Co., No-action letter from SEC [1974-75 Transfer
Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,086 (Dec. 3, 1974) [estate beneficiary]. See 7B J.W. Hics, id., § 10.0513][d].
125. See, e.g., Standard Resources, Inc., No-action letter from SEC (March 12, 1976), [1971-76] Wash. Serv. Bur.
Microfiche, fiche 657, frame F8. More recent staff interpretations of rule 144(a)(3) are nonliteralist and depend on the
application of several criteria. See 7B J.W. H crs, supra note 26, § 10.05[3][k].
126. See generally Nathan, Presumptive Underwriters, 8 REv. SEc. REo. 881 (1975); M. SrmtssRaG, SEcuRnms
REGuLATION 273-74 (1986).
127. See 7B J.W. Hicrs, supra note 26, § 9.02[5][b]; D. GoLDWwAssE, A GUmE To RuLE 144, 424-29 (1978);
Nathan, The SEC's Presumptive Underwriter Doctrine, 7 PLI INSr. SEc. RFG. 269, 282 (R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer &
Vandergrift eds. 1976).
128. See, e.g., Comten, Inc., No-action letter from SEC (March 23, 1976), [1971-76] Wash. Serv. Bur.
Microfiche, fiche 588, frame B2; Docutel Corp., No-action letter from SEC (Dec. 6, 1976), [1971-76] Wash. Serv. Bur.
Microfiche, fiche 169, frame C8. A staff intrepretative response to American Council of Life Ins., No-action letter from
SEC [1983-84 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 177,526 (May 10, 1983), indicates a partial retreat from the
presumptive underwriter doctrine.
129. See, e.g., Nathan, supra note 127, at 280 (remarks by Alan Levenson, Director of the SEC Division of
Corporation Finance); id. at 299.
130. See, e.g., (1) 17 C.F.R. § 230.148 (1987) holders who resell securities issued or sold in connection with
bankruptcy proceedings; J.W. HicKs, supra note 26, § 3.06[6][b]; (2) owners subject to the so-called underwriter or finder
compensation rule, discussed in SEC Release No. 6099 (Aug. 2, 1979) 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2705H, at 2819-7
item (10) & note 8. See 7B J.W. Hcics, supra note 26, § 10.05[3][f]; (3) recipients of more than one percent of shares
issued in certain § 3(a)(10) transactions. See, e.g., Citizens First Bancshares, Inc., No-action letter from SEC (June 17,
1985), [1985] Wash. Serv. Bur. Microfiche, fiche 932, frame B1; Bank of Highland, No-action letter from SEC (Sept.
6, 1984), [1984] Wash. Serv. Bur. Microfiche, fiche 814, frame B 10; Int'l H.R.S. Industries, Inc., No-action letter from
SEC (March 15, 1984), [1984] Wash. Serv. Bur. Microfiche, fiche 759, frame C4. See 7B J.W. HicKs, supra note 26,
§ 3.06[5]; (4) distributees from an employee stock ownership plan. See, e.g., TNP Enters., Inc., No-action letter from
SEC (Oct. 20, 1987), [1987] Wash. Serv. Bur. Microfiche, fiche 1302, frame C9.
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federal securities laws, the Commission should "coordinate and integrate the disclo-
sure system with the exemptive provisions provided by the laws.' 13'
iii. Rule 145(a) Transactions
The Commission has developed special resale controls for recipients of
registered securities sold in a transaction covered by rule 145(a) 32-- a reclassifica-
tion, merger or consolidation, and transfer of assets-and, by analogy, for recipients
of unregistered securities in any. of these transactions that is exempted because of the
availability of either the section 3(a)(9) or 3(a)(10) exemption or the Regulation A
exemption. 3 3 In all three types of transactions, the seller is not required to restrict the
transferability of the securities it delivers in connection with a plan or agreement. The
Commission has determined, however, that any person who is an affiliate of the
company whose assets or capital structure are affected by any of these transactions,
131. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5450 [1973-74 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 79,617 at 83,649
(Jan. 7, 1974) [adoption of rule 147]. The Commission has relied upon this same policy objective in the adoption of rle
144 Release No. 5223, supra note 85; in the adoption of rule 145, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316 [1972-73 Transfer
Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 79,015 (Oct. 6, 1972); and in its announcement of proposed rule 146, SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5336 [1972-73 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,108 (Nov. 28, 1973).
132. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a) (1987):
(a)Transactions Within the Rule. An "offer," "offer to sell," "offer for sale" or "sale" shall be deemed to
be involved, within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act, so far as the security holders of a corporation or
other person are concerned where, pursuant to statutory provisions of the jurisdiction under which such
corporation or other person is organized, or pursuant to provisions contained in its certificate of incorporation
or similar controlling instruments, or otherwise, there is submitted for the vote or consent of such security
holders a plan or agreement for-
(1) Reclassifications. A reclassification of securities of such corporation or other person, other than a stock
split, reverse stock split, or change in par value, which involves the substitution of a security for another
security;
(2) Mergers or Consolidations. A statutory merger or consolidation or similar plan or acquisition in which
securities of such corporation or other person held by such security holders will become or be exchanged for
securities of any other person, unless the sole purpose of the transaction is to change an issuer's domicile solely
within the United States; or
(3) Transfers of Assets. A transfer of assets of such corporation or other person, to another person in
consideration of the issuance of securities of such other person or any of its affiliates, ift
(A) such plan or agreement provides for dissolution of the corporation or other person whose security
holders are voting or consenting; or
(B) such plan or agreement provides for a pro rata or similar distribution of such securities to the security
holders voting or consenting; or
(C) the board of directors or similar representatives of such corporation or other person, adopts resolutions
relative to (A) or (B) above within one year after the taking of such vote or consent; or
(D) the transfer of assets is a part of a pre-existing plan for distribution of such securities, notwithstanding
(A), (B) or (C), above.
Securities issued in transactions described in rule 145(a) may be registered or the transactions might qualify for an
exemption under §§ 3(a)(9), 3(10), (11), and 4(2). Preliminary Note to the Rule. Id. The resale limitations are found in
17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) and (d) (1987), discussed infra notes 134 and 136.
133. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6099 (Aug. 2, 1979) Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 2705H, at 2819-27 item (87).
See also Borland Int'l, Inc., No-action letter from SEC (Sept. 28, 1987), [1987] Wash. Serv. Bur. Microfiche, fiche 1295,
frame B5 [merger effected pursuant to § 3(a)(10)]; St. Ives Holding Co., No-action letter from SEC (July 22, 1987), [1987
Transfer Binder] Federal Securities Law Report (CCH) T 78,465 [merger reorganization pursuant to § 3(a)(10); Commerce
Am. Corp., No-action letter from SEC (Nov. 15, 1985), [1985] Wash. Serv. Bur. Microfiche, fiche 979, frame B14
[merger pursuant to § 3(a)(10)]; Clevepak Corp., No-action letter from SEC (Feb. 23, 1984), [1984] Wash. Serv. Bur.
Microfiche, fiche 745, frame B14 [exchange, following merger, pursuant to § 3(a)(9)]. In these situations the staff advises
that persons who are described in rule 145(c) should resell the unregistered securities received in the transaction in the
manner permitted by rule 145(d)(1) without regard to the holding period required by rule 144(d)(1). See generally Ash,
Reorganizations and Other Exchanges Under Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of 1933, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1980).
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other than the issuer, should not be able to freely resell the securities of the issuer
acquired in connection with the transaction.1 34 According to the SEC, any person
who controls the company that will be affected by the transaction is presumably in a
position to influence the terms of the transaction. 135 In the Commission's view, this
person resembles a private purchaser in a negotiated sale by the issuer and, therefore,
if he publicly offers or sells securities acquired in connection with the transaction he
will be deemed an underwriter within the meaning of section 2(11). Relief from this
prohibition on public resales is provided by rule 145(d) but only if the securityholder
resells pursuant to rule 144 or retains beneficial ownership of the securities for a
period of three years. 136
iv. Private Resales
A securityholder who resells restricted securities privately can avoid underwriter
status by meeting the conditions of the section 4(1-1/2) exemption. 3 7 One of those
conditions, discussed above in connection with limitations imposed by the issuer or
affiliate, 3 8 is that the private purchaser also be subject to a holding period
requirement. The SEC and some commentators believe that the affiliate or nonaffi-
Hate claiming section 4(1-1/2) must do more. 139 The Commission has characterized
the exemption as a "hybrid" which applies only where "some of the established
criteria for sales under both Section 4(1) and Section 4(2) of the Act are satisfied."140
Neither the Commission nor the staff has identified which of the traditional criteria
of a valid section 4(2) offering by an issuer are to become part of a valid section
134. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1987):
(c) Persons and Parties Deemed to be Underwriters. For purposes of this rule, any party to any transaction
specified in paragraph (a), other than the issuer, or any person who is an affiliate of such party at the time of
any such transaction is submitted for vote or consent, who publicly offers or sells securities of the issuer
acquired in connection with any such transaction, shall be deemed to be engaged in a distribution and therefore
to be an underwriter thereof within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. The term "party" as used in this
paragraph (c) shall mean the corporations, business entities, or other persons, other than the issuer, whose assets
or capital structure are affected by the transactions specified in paragraph (a).
Rule 145(e) defines the term "person" for purposes of paragraphs (c) and (d) as having the same meaning as the definition
of that term in 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(2). 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(e) (1987).
135. For a detailed discussion of rule 145, see infra text accompanying notes 215-36.
136. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d) (1987):
(d) Resale Provisions for Persons and Parties Deemed Underwriters. Notwithstanding the provisions of
paragraph (c), a person or party specified therein shall not be deemed to be engaged in a distribution and
therefore not be an underwriter of registered securities acquired in a transaction specified in paragraph (a) of this
section if: (1) such securities are sold by such person or party in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs
(c), (e), (f) and (g) of § 230.144; (2) such person or party is not an affiliate of the issuer and has been the
beneficial owner of the securities for at least two years as determined in accordance with paragraph (d) of
§ 230.144, and the issuer meets the requirements of paragraph (c) of § 230.144; or (3) such person or party is
not, and has not been for at least three months, an affiliate of the issuer and has been the beneficial owner of
the securities for at least three years as determined in accordance with paragraph (d) of § 230.144.
See SEC Securities Act Release No. 6508 (Feb. 10, 1984), [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,489; 7B J.W. Hics, supra note 26, § 9.04[1][b].
137. Technically the so-called § 4(1-1/2) exemption is based on § 4(1). See the detailed discussion infra text
accompanying notes 253-56.
138. See supra text accompanying note 105.
139. See infra note 141.
140. Securities Act Release No. 6188, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 1051 at 2073-28 n.178, 2073-28 & 2073-29
(Feb. 1, 1980).
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4(1-1/2) exemption. It has been suggested, however, that the staff contemplates a
private sale with a limited number of sophisticated buyers accompanied by disclosure
of registration statement information and without general solicitation or
advertising. 141
2. Transferring Transactions
The possibility exists for certain persons who hold securities issued by another
person that the act of transferring those securities will require them to impose resale
limitations on themselves or on their transferee. This potential danger awaits affiliates
but not nonaffiliates. As discussed earlier,1 42 the only impediment to freely tradeable
securities by a nonaffiliate are restrictions that flow out of the acquiring transaction.
An affiliate can encounter the same limitations in his acquiring transaction but he may
also have to create or experience them in order to rely upon the section 4(1) trading
exemption.
An affiliate's acquiring transaction can be free of resale limitations for many
reasons. For instance he might have purchased securities in a registered offering or
in ordinary secondary acquisitions with the assistance of his broker. He might have
bought unrestricted securities in private transactions or received them as a gift from
a nonaffiliate donor. Where an affiliate securityholder decides to resell unrestricted
securities without the benefit of a registration statement he must consider the
possibility that the volume of his resale transaction will reach such significant
proportions that it will be deemed a distribution. In the event of a distribution
attributable to him, the affiliate will be denied an exemption under section 4(1). 143 To
guard against these occurrences the affiliate might decide to structure his resales so
that the transaction meets the conditions of rule 144 or that satisfies the informal
requirements of so-called section 4(1-1/2).44 If the affiliate chooses the first option,
which is available only where the issuer has satisfied the current public information
requirements of rule 144(c), he must sell his securities in brokers' transactions and
in an amount limited by rule 144(e)(1). Securities sold in this fashion are unrestricted
in the hands of the purchaser. 145 Alternatively, the affiliate can sell his securities in
privately negotiated transactions where he must impose resale restrictions on his
buyer and, depending upon the conditions of a section 4(1-1/2) exemption, suffer
additional burdens himself. 146
141. Olander & Jacks, The Section 4(1-112) Exemption-Reading Between the Lines of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 SEc. REo. L.J. 339, 362-63 (1988); see Comment, Reinterpreting the "Section 4(1-112)" Exemption from Securities
Registration: The Investor Protection Requirement, 16 U.S.F.L. R-v. 681 (1982).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 109-12.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 45-55.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 137-41.
145. Because sales pursuant to rule 144 are public in character the securities do not fall within the definition of
restricted securities. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3) (1987). See, e.g., Kidder, Peabody & Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov.
12, 1976), [1971-76] Wash. Serv. Bur. Microfiche, fiche 69, frame A14.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 137-41. The securities that an affiliate sells privately in reliance on §
4(1-1/2) are deemed to be restricted within the meaning of rule 144(a)(3). See, e.g., Candela Laser Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,530 at 77,729 (Sept. 28, 1987).
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III. ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS
Miscbnceptions about what constitutes a transaction or about the purpose that
resale limitations serve as part of a transaction can take many forms. In this part of
the Article, I examine three situations in which resale limitation policy was
determined without proper regard for the analysis that Congress intended: (i) the
coming to rest doctrine under section 3(a)(1 1) as interpreted in Busch v. Carpenter;147
(ii) the Ralston Purina standards 148 as applied to private resales, according to Gilligan,
Will & Co. v. SEC; 149 and (iii) the underwriter status of affiliates in companies
acquired by an issuer in a registered offering, as formulated in rule 145(c). 150 These
three illustrations are useful for several reasons. First, they represent a wide range of
decisionmakers and advocates who regularly help shape resale limitation policy.
Included among those who contributed to these debates are private litigants, district
and appellate courts, and the SEC in the roles of amicus curiae, reviewer of a hearing
officer's decision, appellee before an appellate court, and policymaker in the
adoption of an interpretive rule. Second, the decisions selected for review offer some
evidence of objectivity. They demonstrate that erroneous analysis can occur in an
attempt to liberalize resale limitations, as in Busch v. Carpenter, or to enforce them,
as in Gilligan, Will & Co. and in Rule 145(c). Third, a variety of settings is captured
within this small sample. The issue of resale policy surfaces in connection with both
registered and unregistered public offerings (rule 145(c) and Busch respectively) and
with a nonpublic offering (Gilligan, Will). Finally, these illustrations are a good
introduction to the many forms that mistaken analysis can take: (i) reducing resale
limitations by redefining an issuer's burden of proof (Busch); (ii) incorporating resale
restrictions of one exemption into a dissimilar exemption (Busch and Gilligan, Will);
(iii) equating restrictions from an acquiring transaction with those from a transferring
transaction (Gilligan, Will and rule 145(c)); and (iv) retaining resale limitations for
a transaction that undergoes total regulatory revision (rule 145(c)).
A. The Coming to Rest Doctrine Under Section 3(a)(11)
In order for an intrastate offering to qualify under section 3(a)(11) the issuer
must prove that the issue has come to rest in the hands of persons who have the same
residence as the issuer. 151 The transactional nature of the exemption requires that an
issuer's characterization of an offering as local be evaluated on more than the
residence of the original purchasers even where the issuer has no intention of using
original purchasers as the first step in an interstate distribution. The recommended
method for meeting this condition is for the issuer to restrict resales to residents for
147. 598 F. Supp. 519 (D. Utah 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 827 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1987).
148. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
149. 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
150. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1987). See supra note 134 for full text.
151. Applicability of Exemption of Intrastate Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 1459, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 2260, at 2605-606 (May 29, 1937); Release No. 4434, supra note 64, at 2610.
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a period of at least nine months from the date of the issuer's last sale.152 In Busch v.
Carpenter, the Tenth Circuit rejected this traditional theory for the coming to rest
requirement. 15 3
In October 1980, Carpenter and two other defendants organized Sonic Petro-
leum, Inc. in Utah allegedly in order to acquire, extract, and market material
resources such as oil, gas, and coal. During October and November 1980, Sonic
publicly offered and sold 25,000,000 shares of its stock entirely to Utah residents.
After deducting underwriting costs, Sonic realized net proceeds of $435,000.
Approximately six months after the last intrastate sale, William Mason, an Illinois oil
and gas promoter, contacted defendant Carpenter in his capacity as president of
Sonic, about a merger of Sonic with Mason's operations in Illinois. These discussions
resulted in an agreement, effective May 25, 1981, under which Sonic issued a
controlling interest in Sonic to Mason who, in return, transferred to Sonic an Illinois
drilling corporation that Mason privately owned. The name of Sonic was changed to
Mason Oil Co., Inc. and Carpenter, Jensen (another defendant), Mason, Mason's
wife, and their son became officers and directors of the new company. Shortly
thereafter, William Mason withdrew $351,126 of the $435,000 net proceeds of the
Sonic intrastate offering and deposited them in Illinois. None of these withdrawn
funds was used in Utah. Finally, in May 1981 Mason and Carpenter established
Norbil Investments, a brokerage account in Utah, in order for Mason and his friends
to purchase shares of the new company's stock. From December 1980 through June
18, 1981, the date when the plaintiffs, who were California residents, bought their
stock through Norbil Investments, the shares of Sonic stock were being publicly
traded in the over-the-counter market in Salt Lake City, Utah. 154
Plaintiffs sought rescission under section 12(1) against Carpenter and two other
individuals who were associated with Sonic to recover the purchase price of 76,000
shares of Sonic stock. The complaint alleged that the Sonic securities had not been
registered and did not qualify for the section 3(a)(1 1) exemption. Plaintiffs charged
the individual defendants with liability either as sellers, for purposes of section 12(1),
or as controlling persons under section 15 of the Act. '5
152. The nine-month ban on interstate trading comes from rule 147(e) and is applicable only when the issuer meets
all of the terms and conditions of the rule. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (1987). See also supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
153. 827 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1987).
154. Between May and August, 1981, after Sonic's name had been changed to Mason Oil, approximately 893,000
shares of Mason Oil stock were purchased in the Norbil Investments account for eleven out-of-state purchasers, including
plaintiffs. The shares were held in Norbil's name until late October, 1981 when Carpenter transferred the stock into the
names of the actual purchasers. Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae [hereinafter SEC Brief] at 5-6. Although defendant
Carpenter was not an investing member of Norbil Investments, he was one of its affiliates. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit
found that "Carpenter was a signatory on the Norbil account and bought stock for Mason and his friends in market
transactions through Norbil." 827 F.2d 653, 659 (10th Cir. 1987).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1981):
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection
with an agreement or understanding with one or more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or
otherwise, controls any person liable under [section 11 or 12], shall also be liable jointly and severally with and
to the same extent as such to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person
had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability
of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
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The district court framed the issue for resolution as "whether a resale of an
intrastate offering seven months after all shares were sold to Utah residents voids the
intrastate exemption." 156 The court began its analysis by observing that the language
of section 3(a)(11) does not make the exemption "dependent on not reselling the
stock.' 1 57 It then focused on the uncontested facts and the allegations in the
complaint. It found that at the time the initial sale occurred the Sonic stock was sold
only to Utah residents. It also found "no allegation of any fraud, scheme or other plan
to circumvent the policies of the intrastate exemption through a straw person sale." 158
Without explicitly acknowledging the validity of the SEC's doctrine, the court used
these two factors to conclude that the seven month period from the time of inital sale
to the time of resale was sufficient for the offering to come to rest.' 59 In response to
plaintiffs' argument that Sonic had not complied with rule 147's nine-month ban on
interstate trading the court had two comments. First, the rule is nonexclusive;
noncompliance with the resale limitation in rule 147(e) does not mean that the statute
and the underlying policies have been violated. Second, the rule is considered by
some to be a more restrictive interpretation of section 3(a)(11) than Congress
intended.' 60 Because the court also determined that the issuer had been doing
business in Utah,161 it denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and, finding
that defendants had complied with section 3(a)(1 1), granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, plaintiffs, who were joined by the SEC as an
amicus curiae, abandoned their claim that resale alone was enough to defeat the
exemption. Instead they adopted the Commission's contention that because defen-
dants had the burden to show their right to section 3(a)(l 1), they had the burden at
the trial level to present evidence that the original purchasers of Sonic stock bought
with investment intent. Without such a showing, the SEC argued, summary judgment
for defendants was improper.' 62 The Tenth Circuit rejected the amicus' argument. It
found unacceptable the notion that "the issuer should be required to disprove all the
possible circumstances that might establish the stock has not come to rest." 163 In the
appellate court's opinion it seemed more logical that the party opposing the motion
should have the "burden of producing some contrary evidence on this issue when the
seller claiming the exemption has satisfied the facial requirement of the statute." '16
Once an issuer proves that the stock was sold only to residents, it falls to the plaintiff
"to produce evidence that the stock had not come to rest but had been sold to people
156. 598 F. Supp. 519 (D. Utah 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 827 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1987).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 520.
159. Id.
160. Id. The court cited as an example of the criticism of rule 147, Bennett, The Proposed Federal Securities Code:
"Local Distributions," UTAH B.J., Winter 1979, Summer 1980.
161. 598 F. Supp. 519, 520 (D. Utah 1984), affd inpart, rev'd inpart, 827 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1987). Both sides
agreed that Sonic was a newly formed company, not yet operational, that maintained its offices, books and records in Salt
Lake City. For a discussion of the doing business requirement of section 3(a)(l 1), see generally 7 J.W. HicKs, supra note
26, § 4.04[3].
162. 827 F.2d 653, 656 (10th Cir. 1987).
163. Id. at 657.
164. Id.
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who intended to resell it out of state."' 65 In the face of defendants' undisputed
showing that all of the original buyers were residents and in the absence of any
evidence to suggest that Sonic offered its shares under questionable circumstances,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's ruling that the issue had come to rest. 66
The dispute over the coming to rest requirement at both the district and appellate
court levels involved a direct attack on the transactional nature of section 3(a)(11).
The essence of this challenge, as articulated in the bar journal article cited by the
district court' 67 and in the brief of appellee Carpenter,168 was that Congress intended
the existence of a section 3(a)(1 1) exemption to be determined at the time sales by the
issuer were completed so that no undue restrictions would be placed on resales in the
over-the-counter market. What the Tenth Circuit did in response to this unorthodox
view of section 3(a)(l1) can be explained by looking at two aspects of the SEC's
ineffectual defense of the coming to rest requirement.
The Commission as amicus mounted a powerful case for the transaction concept.
It explained the theoretical connection between resale limitations and a completed
in-state distribution and properly objected to the lower court's characterization of
resales that "void" an existing exemption. 169 However, a more basic part of
defendants' charge was left intact. In support of their position that only the original
sales by the issuer must be made to in-state residents, defendants cited the following
colloquy on the floor of Congress:
Mr. Dirksen: The gentlemen will remember that in the discussion when the bill was under
consideration in the House I voiced some apprehension about small corporate entities whose
securities might be unregistered, that they might be placed under undue restrictions with
respect to the over-the-counter markets. I understand the bill has been amended and an
exception has been made in their favor.
Mr. Rayburn: An exception is made in unregistered securities of companies predominately
intrastate in nature.' 70
165. Id.
166. Id. The Tenth Circuit did not accept the lower court's conclusion that Sonic was doing business in Utah and,
therefore, found that a genuine issue of material fact existed precluding summary judgment in favor of all defendants. Id.
at 659. It determined that none of the defendants, except Carpenter, could qualify as a § 12(1) seller or a person in a
control relationship with Sonic. Accordingly, summary judgment was held to be proper in favor of these defendants. Id.
at 660. Because the record raised issues of fact regarding the extent of Carpenter's participation in the sales, the court held
that summary judgment on this issue was improper. Id.
167. Bennett, supra note 160, at 5. Mr. Bennett served as legal counsel for defendants-appellees Jensen and Burnett.
827 F.2d 653, 654 (10th Cir. 1987). A copy of his barjournal article was included as part of the record in the case. Brief
of Appellee Craig Carpenter at 15 [hereinafter Carpenter Brief].
168. Carpenter Brief, id. at 7-9.
169. SEC Brief, supra note 154, at 9-13. The district court defined the legal issue that it faced, supra text
accompanying note 156, as whether a resale "voids the intrastate exemption." 598 F. Supp. 519 (D. Utah 1984), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 827 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1987). As the SEC correctly stated in its supplemental brief: "mhe
exemption is not available until and unless the distribution is completed in-state. Thus, resales out-of-state that are part
of the distribution do not void an existing exemption. Rather, the offering never did qualify for the exemption."
Supplemental Brief of the Securities & Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, at 7 [hereinafter SEC Supplemental
Brief]. The Tenth Circuit granted appellees' motion to strike the SEC supplemental brief, apparently on the ground that
amici are not entitled to respond. For my purposes, however, the supplemental brief remains a valuable source of
information on the SEC's attitude towards the coming to rest doctrine.
170. 73 CoNG. REc. 10,269 (1934).
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According to defendants, this expression of congressional intent is inconsistent with
an interpretation of section 3(a)(l1) that requires the issuer to monitor each
securityholder's resale for an undetermined period of time. Congress did not intend,
they argued, that these burdens be placed on the issuer or on the secondary sales of
securities from an intrastate offering. 171 In fact the colloquy between Representatives
Dirksen and Rayburn had nothing to do with section 3(a)(11). It occurred during
consideration of the Conference Committee Report on House Bill 9323, in connection
with the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and was concerned with the
possible impact that proposed margin requirements would have on brokerage
customer loans that were collateralized with unlisted securities. 172 But because the
171. Carpenter Brief, supra note 167, at 7 & 9. The defendants criticized the Commission's view, as expressed in
Release No. 4434, supra note 64, that an issuer must take precautions against an intrastate offering becoming an interstate
distribution through resales:
The problem with such an interpretation is that depending on whether or not and to what degree it is carried to
its ultimate end, i.e., the issuer has a duty to monitor each stockholder's resale for an unlimited period of time,
a tremendous burden is placed on the issuer and also on the viability of the secondary or over-the-counter
market. Such burdens were never intended by the Congress, and to the extent such an interpretation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission purports to require the company, at the risk of losing its intrastate
exemption, to monitor or control sales of stock in the secondary market, such an interpretation is contrary to the
intent of Congress, as expressed by Mr. Dirksen in his comments to Congress on the Bill. 78 CONG. Rac., supra.
Id. at 9. See also Bennett, supra note 160, at 4-5.
Bennett and defendants argued that the decision by Congress in 1934 to move the intrastate exemption from § 5(c)
to a section of the statute entitled "Exempted Securities" reflected the change that Representative Rayburn referred to in
his response to Mr. Dirksen. Id. Furthermore, Bennett contended that the objective of the repositioning of the intrastate
exemption was to change it from an exemption of transactions to an exemption of securities. Id. at 5. Although the Tenth
Circuit did not embrace this erroneous reading of the legislative history, a lower court in that circuit was persuaded. Leiter
v. Kuntz, 655 F. Supp. 725, 729-30 n. 10 (D. Utah 1987). For an accurate interpretation of the relocation of the intrastate
exemption, see 1 L. Loss, SEcuRrrss REGULATION 709 (2d ed. 1961).
172. The reference by Representative Dirksen in the quoted interchange, supra note 170, to an earlier discussion was
to a statement that he had made on May 2, 1934, concerning certain provisions in H.R. 9323, including § 6 entitled
"Margin Requirements." H.R. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. to accompany H.R. 9323, April 27, 1934. Paragraph (c) of
proposed § 6 would have made it unlawful for a member of a national securities exchange or a broker or dealer who did
business through such a member to extend or maintain credit in violation of regulations set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b),
or without collateral or on collateral other than an exempted security or a security registered upon a national securities
exchange, except as permitted by special rule and regulations of the Federal Reserve Board. Id. at 19. Representative
Dirksen addressed those comments to the implications of proposed § 6(c):
Paragraph (c) of the same section states that it shall be unlawful for a member of the exchange, or for a broker
or dealer who transacts through a member, to arrange or extend credit to a customer on any registered security
except in accordance with the prescribed rules and regulations. It excludes exempted securities, which include
Government and State and municipal obligations. Now, subsection (2), when read in connection with the above
context, makes it unlawful to extend or arrange customer credit without collateral, or on any collateral other than
registered or exempted securities except as prescribed by the Federal Reserve Board; and the only discretionary
power of the Board is to permit credits on other collateral for a limited time under specified conditions, or to
permit it if such credit is not to be used for purchasing or carrying registered securities.
The language is rather involved, but as I interpret it, I see some rather dangerous implications. Taking out
registered and exempted securities, there remain the unlisted securities. Bear in mind that there are only 788
securities registered on the New York exchange, perhaps 500 on the Chicago exchange, and in similar
proportion on the other exchanges. Then what about the thousands of unlisted securities that corporations in your
district and mine have issued? Apparently these securities cannot be used as collateral in brokerage transactions
if the purpose is to carry or trade in listed securities. Apparently no credit can be extended by a member or by
a broker or dealer operating through a member except in accordance with rules and regulations made by the
Federal Reserve Board. What about the rights of the hundreds of investment houses who now operate as brokers
and dealers under a code of fair practice? If they must be subject to the special rules and regulations of the
Federal Reserve Board, you are placing in the hands of that Board a weapon by which then can ultimately
exercise complete control over all unlisted corporate securities and ultimately concentrate security transactions
in the hands of a few and, incidentally thereto, control and regiment all business in this country.
73 CONG. Rac. 7960. As a result of House Report No. 1838, 73rd Cong, 2nd Sess. (Conference Report) to accompany
H.R. 9323, May 31, 1934, the margin requirements were moved to § 7, with paragraph (c) excluding from the margin
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defendants' misreading of legislative history was not contradicted, it strengthened
their assertion that resales are not part of the issuer's transaction and that traditional
resale limitations under section 3(a)(1 1) are too restrictive. The significance of these
propositions is evident in both the district and appellate court opinions.173
The second problem with the Commission's effort to justify resale restrictions
was its contention that in order to qualify for the exemption an issuer must prove
"that the original buyers bought with investment intent."' 174 Although the appellate
court endorsed this interpretation, 175 the view is inconsistent with the statutory
scheme and with the Commission's own position in rule 147(e).
By requiring an intrastate issuer to prove the investment intent of the initial
purchasers, the SEC as amicus transformed section 3(a)(1 1) into a version of section
4(2). Post-acquisition conduct by original buyers, according to the amicus brief, has
the same relevance to intrastate offerings as it does to private placements.
Where, as in the present case, the securities are resold out of state within a relatively short
period of time, that fact may cause "evidentiary light" on the question of whether those
securities actually came to rest in the hands of in-state purchasers, and may suggest that the
stock was not taken with investment intent. 176
Under this approach intrastate buyers who lack the requisite investment intent become
potential statutory underwriters as persons who have purchased from the issuer with
a view to resale. 177 A major weakness with this position is that neither the statute nor
the legislative history supports a literal application of section 2(11) to every person
who purchases securities from an issuer in a public offering even if he does acquire
them with a view towards immediate resale. In nonpublic offerings under sections
4(2) and 4(6), a requirement of investment intent serves the purpose of the
exemptions by restricting the transactions to persons who can fend for themselves. 178
A public offering exempted under section 3(a)(1 1) is based on an entirely different
regulations "an exempted security." Id. at 7. The term "exempted security," which appeared in § 7(c), was defined in
§ 3(a)(12) to include "such other securities (which may include, among others, unregistered securiites, the market in
which is predominantly intrastate) as the Commission [the SEC] may, by such rles and regulations" exempt from the
operation of any of the provisions of the statute. Id. at 4. After the colloquy between Representatives Dirksen and Rayburn
quoted in the text, supra note 170, the House agreed to the conference report. 78 CoNG. Rac. 10269.
173. The district court stated that the statute by its literal language does not make the exemption dependent on not
reselling the stock. 598 F. Supp. 519 (D. Utah 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 827 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1987). It then
added: "This Court previously dismissed an S.E.C. complaint that alleged that all stock was sold only to residents of Utah
and a subsequent resale took place one month later. SEC v. Curtis Minerals, No. C-336-69 (Nov. 19, 1971 D. Utah)."
598 F. Supp. at 519-20. Mr. Bennett, who advanced the erroneous interpretation of the Dirksen-Raybum colloquy, supra
note 171, was listed as counsel to defendant Curtis Minerals.
174. 827 F.2d 653, 656 (10th Cir. 1987).
175. See id.
176. SEC Brief, supra note 154, at 11.
177. SEC Supplemental Brief, supra note 169, at 5. Referring to the legislative history of § 4(1), H.R. REP. No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1933), the Commission stated:
As this shows, Congress was concerned, when it enacted the Securities Act, with protecting persons who
purchase securities from issuers, underwriters or dealers. In this regard, "underwriters" were defined to include
"anyperson who has purchasedfrom an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with,
the distribution of any security." Section 2(11), 15 U.S.C. 77b(1 1) (emphasis added). Thus, among the
purchasers protected by the Act are persons who purchase in resale transactions from persons who themselves
have purchased from the issuer with a view to resale.
Id.
178. See SEC v. Ralston Purina, Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953), discussed infra text accompanying note 198.
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rationale. As the amicus correctly expressed it, purchasers of securities in section
3(a)(1 1) offerings "are in-state residents, sales to whom can be adequately regulated
by state authorities, and who can be expected to be familiar with the issuer and thus
do not need the protection of federal registration.- 179 These reasons for the
exemption justify a limitation on resales but they do not require the safeguard of
investment intent that serves different goals under section 4(2).
The Commission's own rules are at odds with the position advanced in Busch.
Rule 144(a)(3), which defines restricted securities that must be taken with investment
intent, does not include securities issued under section 3(a)(1 1).180 More importantly,
the safe harbor rule 147 does not require purchasers to invest. Paragraph (e)
acknowledges that trading activity can commence contemporaneously with the
issuer's distribution. 181 The only warning to an issuer is to be certain that until nine
months after its final sale "all resales of any part of the issue, by any person, shall
be made only to persons resident within such state or territory."182 Under rule 147(e)
the critical issue, then, is not whether original purchasers have taken for investment
but rather whether they have taken without a view to resale or distribution to
nonresidents.
The Tenth Circuit opinion in Busch has made it easier for an issuer to market
securities in reliance on section 3(a)(1 1). Under the Busch construction all the issuer
must do to demonstrate an issue at rest is to prove the residence of original
purchasers 18 3 and avoid sales under circumstances that indicate a plan of evasion. 184
179. SEC Supplemental Brief, supra note 169, at 6. See generally 7 J.W. HMCKS, supra note 26, § 4.09.
180. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3) (1987). See also John F. Davis, SEC No-Action Letter, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,240 (Dec. 19, 1972), in which the staff reported as the position of the Division
of Corporation Finance that "the provisions of Rule 144 do not apply to the sale of securities acquired under Section
3(a)(l 1) of the Act." Id. at 82,719.
181. Rule 147(e) requires that "[during the period in which securities that are part of an issuer are being offered
and sold by the issuer.. ." all resales must be limited to residents. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (1987). See also Synbiotics
Corp., No-Action Letter from SEC (July 22, 1985), [1985] Wash. Serv. Bur. Microfiche, fiche 942, frame C13 where
the staff reiterated that "[p]rior to the expiration of the nine-month period, resales may be made only to other residents
of the same state." Id. at El.
182. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (1987).
183. The court stated that "[in the face of defendants' undisputed showing that all of the original buyers were Utah
residents, plaintiffs were therefore required to produce evidence that the stock had not come to rest but had been sold to
people who intended to resell it out of state." 827 F.2d 653, 657 (10th Cir. 1987). It noted that:
In their complaint, motion for summary judgment, and response to defendants' cross motion for summary
judgment, plaintiffs consistently asserted that the stock issue had not come to rest only because it had been
resold to non-residents within seven months. Plaintiffs did not assert that the original buyers were not Utah
residents, or that these purchasers bought intending to resell rather than for investment purposes. Plaintiffs also
did not assert that defendants' motion for summary judgment was deficient because defendants had not
presented undisputed evidence of the original buyers' investment intent. The intent of the original purchasers
was not the focus of the motions below, and allocation of the burden of showing this intent was not raised by
the parties or addressed by the district court.
Id. at n.3.
184. The court distinguished cases cited by the SEC as authority for a traditional construction of the coming to rest
doctrine, stating:
This is not a case like Capital Funds, 348 F.2d 582, in which a resident broker received stock without a
subscription agreement, paid no consideration, resold to non-residents a few days later, and possibly earned a
commission. See also Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1957) (acquaintance of
corporate officers persuaded non-residents to buy from resident broker Wtho had received stock absent
consideration and who earned comnission on sales); SEC v. Hillsboro Investment Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86
(D.N.H. 1958) (stock transferred out of state after being listed in name of resident for 30 days and before
offering had closed).
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No longer must an issuer in an intrastate offering place a restrictive legend on the
certificate or other document evidencing the security or issue stop transfer instruc-
tions to its transfer agent. With this lighter burden of proof for the issuer come
commensurate benefits for buyers. Interstate resales can begin more quickly. But,
given the reasons for the liberalization, issuers and securityholders are not entitled to
these improvements. They are the products of a misguided view of a section 3(a)(1 1)
transaction and the proper purpose that resale limitations serve in that transaction.
B. Ralston Purina Criteria and Private Sales Under Section 4(1)
Section 4(2) exempts from the provisions of section 5 "transactions by an issuer
not involving any public offering." 185 The United States Supreme Court considered
this exemption in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.186 and concluded that the applicability
of section 4(2) "should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected need
the protection of the Act." 1 87 According to the Court, " [a]n offering to those who are
shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction 'not involving any public
offering.' "188
Ostensibly, section 4(2) has nothing in common with section 4(1). The private
placement exemption, as section 4(2) is sometimes called, is available only to an
issuer. Section 4(1) specifically excludes transactions by an issuer. The exemptions
serve entirely different purposes. Nonetheless, a connection has been made between
the two exemptive provisions. In addition to excluding transactions by an issuer,
section 4(1) excludes transactions by an underwriter. The term "underwriter" is
defined in section 2(11) to include any person who has purchased from an issuer (or
an affiliate of an issuer) with a view to "the distribution of any security." The term
"distribution" in section 2(11) is not defined, but is equated with the phrase "public
offering." As a result, a claim that section 4(1) exempts a particular transaction by
a person who is clearly not an issuer or dealer depends on whether his transaction, by
itself or as part of a larger transaction, is or is not a "public offering." If the
transaction is one "not involving any public offering," and it is not affected by the
Id. at 657. The SEC could not persuade the Tenth Circuit to reject the district court's view that in the absence of any scheme
to evade the statute through "straw man" transactions the exemption is satisfied by initial sales in state. According to the
amicus brief, the district court developed this position from the unreported decision in SEC v. Curtis Minerals, supra note
173, in which a district court, without any inquiry into the intent of the purchasers, held that stock sold out of state within
one month of the initial offering had come to rest in-state where no scheme to evade the statute had been shown. SEC
Brief, supra note 154, at 12. The SEC argued:
Curtis Minerals, we submit, was incorrectly decided. It was apparently based on a misreading of this Court's
decision in Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis. In Stadia, this Court concluded that a scheme to sell securities
to out-of-state residents through sham sales to an in-state broker destroyed the intrastate exemption. 251 F.2d
at 275. That decision, however, did not suggest that a scheme to evade the statute is invariably a prerequisite
for the conclusion that the intrastate exemption has not been satisfied.
Indeed, such an interpretation would eviscerate the limitation of the exemption to truly local offerings to
local investors. If the issuer could qualify its offering for the exemption by merely turning a blind eye to who
was purchasing, ostensibly local offerings could readily become interstate offerings through resales by
purchasers, such as broker-dealers, who might have no investment intent.
Id. at 12-13.
185. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1981).
186. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
187. Id. at 125.
188. Id.
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issuer or a dealer, it qualifies under section 4(1). The practical problem is how to
determine whether an offering by a person who insists that he is not an underwriter
was in fact "public" or "private." Some courts have found the answer in the judicial
construction of section 4(2).189 These courts, which take their cue from the Second
Circuit decision in Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 190 impose transfer limitations on
certain securityholders that are usually cohfined to an issuer.
The administrative action against Gilligan, Will & Co., a registered broker-
dealer, and its two partners followed an offering by Crowell-Collier of three million
dollars of its five percent convertible debentures in reliance on the private placement
exemption. 19 1 Gilligan purchased $100,000 of the debentures from an agent of the
issuer representing that he was acquiring them for his own investment account and not
for distribution. Within one month, however, Gilligan sold one-half of the debentures
to two friends, Louis Alter and Michael Mooney, and placed another $5,000 of
debentures in the registrant's trading account. Approximately one year later,
Gilligan, the registrant, and the other two subpurchasers converted the debentures
into common stock and sold the stock at a profit on the American Stock Exchange. 192
The Commission in its administrative decision found that the respondents were
underwriters with respect to the 1955 and 1956 transactions in Crowell-Collier
debentures and stock and suspended them from the NASD for five days. 193 On
appeal, petitioners asserted that they were not "underwriters," as defined in section
2(11), and that, therefore, they were entitled to the ordinary trading exemption which
was then located in the first clause of section 4(1). 194 They disclaimed any reliance
on the second clause of section 4(1), i.e., the private placement exemption presently
located in section 4(2). Petitioners contended that the resale transactions were distinct
and separate from the offering by the issuer, Crowell-Collier, and argued that whether
there was a distribution "must be judged solely by their own acts and intention, and
not by the acts or intention of the issuer or others." 195 According to the court, the
petitioners' legal theory boiled down to this: "[W]hether the total offering was in fact
public, their purchases and sales may be found to be exempt on the ground that they
189. See, e.g., Leiter v. Kuntz, 655 F. Supp. 725, 729 (D. Utah 1987); Neuwirth Inv. Fund, Ltd. v. Swanton,
[1975-76 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 195,372 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co.,
334 F. Supp. 444 (N.D. Tex. 1971), af'd, 477 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Computronic Indus. Corp., 294 F. Supp.
1136 (N.D. Tex. 1968); Hirtenstein v. Tenny, 252 F.Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus,
[1964-66 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Fuller v. Dilbert, 32 F.R.D. 60
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
190. 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959). Although the Second Circuit's decision in
Gilligan, Will & Co. is usually cited as the first major opinion that linked Ralston Purina criteria with § 4(1), an earlier
case had already made the connection. Collier v. Mikel Drilling Co., 183 F. Supp. 104, 110-12 (D. Minn. 1958) (the
court concluded that secondary sales were not public offerings within the meaning of the Act).
191. In re Gilligan, Will & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 5689 [1957-61 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 76,584 (May 7, 1958). The administrative action against Gilligan, Will & Co. was only one of three such actions
against registered broker-dealers growing out of the Crowell-Collier offering. See also In re Elliott & Co., Exchange Act
Release No. 5688 [1957-61 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 76,583 (May 7, 1958); In re Dempsey & Co.,
Exchange Act Release No. 5690, [1957-61 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,585 (May 7, 1958).
192. In re Gilligan, Will & Co., supra note 191, at 80,260.
193. Id. at 80,263-64.
194. Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959). In 1964,
Congress renumbered the provisions of § 4 and denominated what had been the first clause of § 4(1) as § 4(1) and the
second clause of § 4(1) as § 4(2). Act of Aug. 20, 1964, 78 Stat. 580, §12.
195. Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
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were not underwriters if their own resales did not amount to a public offering." 196
The Second Circuit disagreed with the petitioners' characterization of their resales as
nonpublic and affirmed the Commission's order. It found that "the resales
contemplated and executed by petitioners were themselves a distribution or public
offering as the latter term has been defined by the Supreme Court, and we therefore
find that petitioners were underwriters and that their transactions were not exempt
under § 4(1)."' 197
The analysis that led to the Court's conclusion began with the following
statement of what it considered was the applicable law:
In S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 1953, 346 U.S. 119, 73 S. Ct. 981, 97 L. Ed. 1494, the
Supreme Court considered the exemptions provided by § 4(1). Two of its holdings are
significant here. First, it held that an issuer who claims the benefit of an exemption from § 5
for the sale of an unregistered security has the burden of proving entitlement to it. The
rationale of this result applies as well to a broker-dealer who claims the benefit of a similar
exemption. We therefore find that the burden was upon the petitioners to establish that they
were not underwriters within the meaning of § 4(1).
The Court also defined the standard to be applied in determining whether an issue is a
public offering. It held that the governing fact is whether the persons to whom the offering
is made are in such a position with respect to the issuer that they either actually have such
information as a registration would have disclosed, or have access to such information. 346
U.S. at pages 125-127, 73 S. Ct. at pages 984-85.198
Turning to the facts as stipulated, the Court found that the relationship between
Gilligan and the firm, as sellers, and the friends to whom petitioners had sold the
unregistered debentures did not meet the Ralston Purina criteria for a nonpublic
offering:
[T]he purchasers "were not supplied with material information of the scope and character
contemplated by the Securities Act nor were the purchasers in such a relation to the issuer
as to have access to such information concerning the company and its affairs." Such a
stipulation ... concedes the very proposition of which the petitioners had to establish the
negative in order to prevail, and we therefore think it dispositive of the question whether
petitioners "purchased ... with a view to ... distribution."'199
The Second Circuit opinion yielded the correct result but it also created
unnecessary confusion. Several courts have relied on the Gilligan, Will & Co.
decision as authority for requiring any person who claims a section 4(1) exemption
for an allegedly nonpublic offering to prove that his transaction conformed to the
standards outlined by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Ralston Purina.2°° This line of
cases and the proposition that they support can be traced to the Second Circuit's
interpretation of Ralston Purina. The petitioners in Gilligan, Will & Co. made it clear
that they were relying on the first clause of section 4(I)--i.e., the ordinary trading
exemption-and not on the second clause of section 4()-i.e., the private placement
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 466-67.
200. See cases listed supra note 191.
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exemption. 20' Nonetheless, the Second Circuit concluded that the two exemptions
were similar and decided that the Supreme Court's holdings in Ralston Purina were
applicable to both exemptions.
A careful reading of SEC v. Ralston Purina reveals that the Second Circuit was
incorrect on this point. The second clause of section 4(1) was the only exemption
before the Supreme Court for judicial interpretation in Ralston Purina.20 2 In
construing that exemption, the Supreme Court stated:
The natural way to interpret the private offering exemption is in light of the statutory
purpose. Since exempt transactions are those as to which "there is no practical need for [the
bill's] application," the applicability of § 4(1) should turn on whether the particular class of
person affected needs the protection of the Act. An offering to those who are shown to be
able to fend for themselves is, a transaction "not involving any public offering."203
Presumably, it was this quoted passage from Ralston Purina that the Second
Circuit relied on for its conclusion that the Supreme Court was interpreting all of the
exemptions in section 4(1).204 In any event, the Second Circuit read into Ralston
Purina more than the Supreme Court had specifically held. It is possible that the
Supreme Court intended the statement "the applicability of § 4(1) should turn on
whether the particular class of persons needs the protection of the Act," in its opinion
to apply to all of the exemptions then subsumed under section 4(1). In the context of
the Supreme Court's reason for granting certiorari, i.e., "an apparent need to define
the scope of the private offering exemption,"205 such a liberal construction of the
Court's statement seems unintended and is certainly not part of the Court's holding.
The Second Circuit's expansive reading of Ralston Purina cannot be explained by
the absence of an alternative doctrine to regulate petitioners' conduct. The availabil-
ity of controlling authority could not have been more convenient. In its own decision
to suspend Gilligan, Will & Co. and in its brief to the Second Circuit, the Commission
had provided the court with two theories for applying the Ralston Purina standards
properly.
In the administrative forum, Gilligan, Will & Co. and its partners contended that
their resales were distinct from the transactions of others. 20 6 It was in the context of
this defense by respondents that the Commission discussed the Supreme Court's
criteria for a valid private placement. The SEC determined that respondents were part
of the primary offering, and that unless all of the purchasers of debentures from
persons who were in the first level of the issuer's offering-including respondents-
qualified under the criteria of Ralston Purina, the issuer's claim to a private
placement exemption had to fail and respondents would then become underwriters in
a public distribution. According to the SEC, respondents' entitlement to the benefits
201. Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
202. See SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119, 120 (1953) (the Court framed the issue with respect to the second
clause of § 4(1)).
203. Id. at 124-25.
204. The Second Circuit did not cite any specific page in Ralston Purina as authority for the conclusion that "the
Supreme Court considered the exemptions provided by § 4(1)."
205. SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119, 120 (1953).
206. 38 S.E.C. 388, 393 (1958).
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of an exemption under the first clause of section 4(1) depended on their ability to
demonstrate the issuer's right to an exemption under the second clause of section 4(1)
as construed by the Supreme Court in Ralston Purina.20 7
The Commission's second theory for concluding that petitioners had failed to
prove that their transactions were exempt was based on one of the holdings in SEC
v. Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association.20 8 In its brief in response to
Gilligan, Will & Co.'s appeal, the Commission asserted that petitioners were
participants in a public offering by Crowell-Collier that did not comply with section
5.209 According to the SEC, "if Crowell-Collier did otherwise have an exemption,
petitioners' activities by themselves foreclosed the exemption. "210 With the loss of
a private placement exemption for the issuer, the petitioners, who "were ... clearly
a primary channel for the distribution of Crowell-Collier securities to the public,' '211
were in the same position as the Association in Chinese Consolidated. As persons
who were "engaged in steps necessary to the distribution of unregistered securities,"
they lost their right to an exemption under the first clause of section 4(1). Under this
theory, petitioners could have prevailed in their claims for an exemption had they
been able to demonstrate that the entire offering, including their part, was nonpublic.
Had they shown that the offering was nonpublic, in accordance with the criteria
articulated by the Supreme Court, the petitioners would have established a valid
private placement exemption for Crowell-Collier and thereby would have made it
impossible for them to be deemed participants in a nonexempted and unregistered
distribution. Petitioners, however, were unable to qualify for the issuer's offering
under the Ralston Purina standards.
Both theories advanced by the SEC in its brief to the Second Circuit recognize
that sections 4(1) and 4(2) are separate and distinct transactional exemptions.
Unfortunately, neither of these theories was included in the court's opinion.
Furthermore, these two theories properly explain the limited relationship between
Ralston Purina and a claim to a section 4(1) exemption.
The Ralston Purina standards are relevant to a determination of whether a
transaction by a person other than an issuer or dealer is exempted by section 4(1) only
where the person claiming that exemption allegedly (i) purchased from the issuer with
a view to distribution, (ii) sold for the issuer in connection with a distribution, or (iii)
participated in a distribution by an issuer. In these situations, the person claiming an
exemption under section 4(1) must overcome the allegation that the issuer was
engaged in an unregistered public offering and that he, the claimant, either functioned
as a statutory underwriter for the issuer or participated with the issuer in a significant
207. Id. at 392-93.
208. 120 F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618-19 (1941).
209. Brief for the SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959) [hereinafter SEC Gilligan Brief],
at 15-17. The SEC contended that the administrative decision was based on this theory, despite the fact that Chinese
Consolidated was not discussed in 38 S.E.C. 388, Exchange Act Release No. 5688. In its brief, the Commission
assserted: "But the Commission did not rest alone on petitioners' failure to meet its statutory burden [i.e., proving that
they were not underwriters]. The Commission concluded from the incontrovertible facts in the stipulation that petitioners
in their own activities partcipated in a distribution or a public offering." Id. at 25.
210. Id. at 25.
211. Id.
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way. If the claimant can establish that the offering by the issuer was nonpublic (i.e.,
not a distribution) and was exempted by section 4(2), he will be entitled to a section
4(1) exemption. Where the claimant adopts this approach, it is appropriate for the
SEC or a court to assess the entire transaction, including the offers and sales by the
person seeking the protection of section 4(1), in the light of the criteria and standards
that have evolved under section 4(2) and decide whether the issuer's offering was in
fact exempted under the private placement exemption. 2 12
The Ralston Purina criteria have no relevance to a case in which the person
claiming a section 4(1) exemption allegedly participated in a secondary distribution
not involving the issuer. Several cases that purport to be based on Gilligan, Will &
Co. reach the opposite conclusion. 2 13 However, since all of these cases did not
involve an alleged distribution by the issuer, section 4(2) was irrelevant. The person
seeking the ordinary trading exemption, who allegedly (i) purchased from an affiliate
with a view to distribution, (ii) sold for the affiliate in connection with a distribution,
or (iii) participated in a distribution by an affiliate, must establish that the affiliate's
offering did not constitute a "distribution" for purposes of section 2(11). By showing
that the affiliate's offering was exempted by section 4(1), the reseller establishes his
right to that same exemption. Since an affiliate cannot rely upon section 4(2) to
exempt a nonpublic offering, any application of the Ralston Purina criteria in
determining the reseller's right to section 4(1) is misplaced. 2 14
C. Underwriter Status in Registered Rule 145 Transactions
Ordinarily a purchaser of securities in a registered public offering does not
experience resale limitations arising out of that acquiring transaction. An important
exception to this general proposition occurs when certain securityholders acquire
registered securities in a rule 145 transaction. As explained earlier, 215 the Commis-
sion has adopted the position, formally reflected in rule 145(c), 216 that persons who
are affiliates of business entities which are acquired pursuant to the rule will be
deemed to be statutory underwriters of the acquiring company's securities that they
receive in that transaction if they resell them to the public. Paragraph (d) of the rule
permits eligible holders of registered securities acquired in a rule 145 transaction to
avoid underwriter status by reselling those securities in accordance with prescribed
limitations that can include holding period requirements. 2 7 For purposes of rule
145(c), it is irrelevant that the person deemed to be an underwriter has no affiliation
with the issuer or that he received an insignificant amount of the securities that were
212. For an example of a judicial opinion that properly invoked the Ralston Purina criteria, see the court of appeals
opinion in Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
213. See supra note 189.
214. The SEC has also misapplied Ralston Purina criteria to a secondary distribution. See In re Gearhart & Otis,
Inc., 42 S.E.C. 1, 5-8 (1964), aff'd sub noma., Gearhart & Otis, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 132-36.
216. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1987). For the full text of paragraph (c), see supra note 134.
217. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d) (1987). For the full text of paragraph (d), see supra note 136.
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used to effect the business combination. The rationale for this administrative
interpretation of section 2(11) can be traced to the no-sale theory and rule 133.218
The no-sale rule developed as an administrative interpretation of the definitions
contained in section 2(3) within the context of those business combinations where (1)
the vote or consent of a majority of the stockholders in a disappearing company was
required as a prerequisite for a merger, consolidation, or sale of assets, and (2) the
vote or consent, once obtained, would be binding on all the stockholders except for
the statutory appraisal rights for dissenters. 219 It proceeded on the theory that in such
transactions a decision to relinquish securities in return for the acquiring company's
securities was essentially a corporate act and that the volitional act on the part of the
individual stockholder required for a "sale" was missing. The basis of this theory
"was that the exchange or alteration of the stockholder's security occurred not
because he consented thereto but because the corporate action, authorized by a
specified majority of the interests affected converted his security into a different
security.'' 22 The no-sale rule provided the participants in a business combination
with two benefits, only one of which carried an administrative blessing. As a result
of the no-sale rule, the registration provisions of section 5 had no application to the
securities transaction between the issuer of the securities (i.e., the surviving party to
the combination) and the stockholders in the disappearing company. In addition, the
no-sale rule had the unintended side effect of weakening traditional criteria for
determining underwriter status under section 2(11). If the securities transaction
between the acquiring company and the stockholders of the disappearing company
did not constitute a "sale," as provided for under the no-sale rule, it seemed to follow
that none of the recipients of the acquiring company's securities could be viewed as
having "purchased" securities from the issuer with a view to their distribution,
within the meaning of section 2(11). The logic of this argument was not lost on the
business community, with the result that unrestricted resales by recipients of
unregistered securities developed into a serious problem for members of the investing
public who had little or no information about an issuer.
The no-sale rule was formalized in 1951 as rule 133, but did not contain any
provision for limiting resales by recipients. 22 1 During the succeeding eight years, and
especially from 1956 through 1958, the Commission struggled with the abuses that
were posed by unregulated resales of rule 133 securities. 222 The problem usually
218. 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1987) [hereinafter rule 1331. For an overview of the no-sale theory and rule 133, see
Purcell, A Consideration of the No-Sale Theory Under the Securities Act of 1933, 24 BRoorKLvr L. Rav. 254 (1958)
[hereinafter Purcell]; Sargent, A Review of the "No-Sale" Theory of Rule 133, 13 Bus. LAw. 78 (1957).
219. Securities Act Release No. 493(c) 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCil) 3090.566 (Sept. 20, 1935). See Purcell, supra
note 218, at 257.
220. New Rules Relating to Business Combinations, Securities Act Release No. 5316 [1972-73 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) S 79,015, at 82,198 (Oct. 6, 1972) [hereinafter Release No. 5316]. rule 145 became effective
January 1, 1973. Id. at 82,205. The no-sale theory was rescinded and rule 133 only continued to apply to the completion
of certain transactions submitted for shareholder consent before January 1, 1973. Id.
221. "No-sale" theory, Securities Act Release No. 33-3420, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3090.565, at 3113-8
(Aug. 2, 1951).
222. The Commission's battle to close the loopholes in rule 133 was fought at two levels, in litigation and in a series
of proposed revisions to the no-sale rule. The two most important legal actions were SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls,
Inc., 148 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (the court concluded the "Rule 133 is not applicable to an 'exchange' of assets
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emerged as the last in a series of steps by a private company seeking to use rule 133
as the way of "going public" without complying with the registration requirements
of the Act. In these especially troublesome cases,
persons in control of a company wishing to dispose of its stock to the public without
registration (which controlling stockholders cannot do), arrange for its merger etc., into a
second company which, under Rule 133, does not require registration; as a result of such
merger etc., they became a minority, i.e., noncontrolling stockholders, of the surviving
company; they then can . . . legally dispose of their minority interests in the surviving
company without registration. -
The Commission's first systematic solution to the problem was announced in a 1959
release in which the agency reaffirmed the no-sale theory. But the release also
announced the adoption of an amendment to rule 133 that provided for registration in
those situations in which securities previously issued in a rule 133 transaction were
offered to the public by any person who, under a new provision of the rule, was
designated an underwriter. 224 The new paragraph, rule 133(c), interpreted the
statutory term "underwriter" to include those persons in a control relationship with
any party to the business combination who acquired securities in a rule 133
transaction "with a view to the distribution thereof. ' '225 In deciding to use an
administrative interpretation of the section 2(11) definition as the basis for regulating
some of the resale transactions in rule 133 securities, the Commission was necessarily
challenging many of the implications of a no-sale theory that it continued to support.
In doing so, the SEC found itself in the difficult position of defending a construction
of the Act that contained logical inconsistencies.2 6 In May 1972, after further
study, 227 the Commission finally decided to abandon the "no-sale theory"
for stock which is but a step in the major activity of selling the stock"); In re Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd. & Kroy Oils
Ltd., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5483 [1957-61 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,516 (April
8, 1957). For a critical discussion of these two cases, see Purcell, supra note 218, at 261-69. Efforts to revise rule 133
during the period from 1956 to 1958 include: Notice of Proposed Amendment of Rule 133, Securities Act Release No.
3965 [1957-61 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 76,609 (Sept. 15, 1958); Notice of Proposed Revision of
Rule 133, Securities Act Release No. 3698 [1952-56 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 76,409 (Oct. 2, 1956);
Referral of Action of Proposed Revision of Rule 133, Securities Act Release No. 3761 [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,510 (March 15, 1957); Letter of SEC Concerning Rule 133, Securities Act Release No. 3762
[1957-61 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 76,511 (March 15, 1957).
223. Memorandum of Subcommittee of the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the Section of
Corporation, Banking & Business Law of the American Bar Association (Mar. 25, 1957), quoted in Purcell, supra note
218, at 288.
224. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4115 (July 16, 1959). Amended rule 133(c) stated:
(c) Any constituent corporation, or any person who is an affiliate of a constituent corporation at the time any
transaction specified in paragraph (a) is submitted to a vote of the stockholders of such corporation, who
acquires securities of the issuer in connection with such transaction with a view to the distribution thereof shall
be deemed to be an underwriter of such securities within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. A transfer
by a constituent corporation to its security holders of securities of the issuer upon a complete or partial
liquidation shall not be deemed a distribution for the purpose of this paragraph.
225. Id. The source of this aspect of the 1959 amendment to rule 133 appears to be the Commission's interpretation
of the rule in In re Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd. & Kray Oils, Ltd., supra note 222, at 80,07 1. Cf. Purcell supra note 218,
at 265-66. For an illustration of rule 133(c) in operation, see SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., [1972-73 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 93,631, at 92,865 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd 489 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1973).
226. See, e.g., Throop, Recent Developments with Respect to Rule 133, 15 Bus. LAw. 119, 122 (1959).
227. See, e.g., Wheat Report, supra note 12, at 248-96, which, in 1969, recommended that the Commission
abandon the no-sale rule and replace it with mandated disclosure appropriate for the circumstances; Proposed Revision of
Rule 133 Securities Act Release No. 5012 [1969-70 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 77,748 (Oct. 9, 1969).
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embodied in rule 133 because it "overlooks the substance of the transactions
specified therein and ignores the fundamental nature of the relationship between the
stockholders and the corporation and between stockholders."' 228
In its place, the Commission recommended the adoption of a "sale theory" for
business combinations that contemplated the use of a registration statement specifi-
cally tailored for these transactions. The proposed regulation, designated rule 145,
contained a paragraph that would have imposed statutory underwriter status on certain
stockholders of the disappearing company. However, instead of identifying under-
writers by reference to control relationships that prospective recipients had within the
disappearing company, proposed rule 145(c) would have defined recipients as
underwriters solely by virtue of the amount of securities acquired in the
transaction229 -a concept that was very similar to the presumptive underwriter
doctrine that the SEC staff had developed for a similar problem.2 0 By October 1972,
when rule 145 was formally adopted, 231 the Commission had reconsidered the
wisdom of defining underwriter status through objective standards232 and returned to
"criteria patterned after those now contained in rule 133."2 3 As the Commission
explained in the release announcing the adoption of rule 145:
Revised paragraph (c) of the Rule provides that any party to any transaction specified in Rule
145(a), other than the issuer, or any person who is an affiliate of such party at the time any
228. Proposed Rescission of Rule 133, Securities Act Release No. 5246 [1971-72 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 78,753, at 81,567 (May 2, 1972).
229. Proposed rule 145(c) stated:
(c) For the purposes of this rule, any person who offers or sells registered securities acquired in a transaction
specified in paragraph (a) of this rule shall be deemed to be engaged in a distribution and therefore to be an
underwriter of such securities, within the meaning of § 2(11) of the Act, if the amount of securities acquired
in such transaction exceeds the following:
(I) If securities of the same class are admitted to trading on a national securitites exchange, the lesser of (A)
one percent of the shares or other units of the class outstanding as shown by the registration statement, or (B)
the average weekly reported volume of trading in such securities on all securities exchanges during the four
calendar weeks preceding the effective date of such statement; (2) If securities of the same class are not traded
on a national securities exchange but are traded in the over the counter market, one percent of the shares or other
units of the class outstanding as shown by the registration statement; or (3) If on the effective date of the
registration statement there is no public trading market for the securities of the class covered by the registration
statement, five percent of the shares or other units of such class registered.
Id. at 81,574.
230. See supra note 130.
231. Release No. 5316, supra note 220.
232. The Commission offered the following explanation for rejecting proposed rule 145(c):
Rule 145(c), as proposed, contained specific criteria designed to clarify the underwriter status of persons who
acquire substantial amounts of securities in a business combination registered on Form S-14, and who desire to
resell such securities. The public comments on the proposal noted legal and policy arguments against any
interpretation that imposes statutory underwriter status on persons solely by virtue of their receiving more than
a certain amount of securities in a business combination. In addition, technical problems were cited in the
application of the percentage tests in proposed Rule 145(c), and it was suggested that underwriter's liability
should not be imposed on persons who may not be in a position to perform any necessary due diligence
investigation. Others described the practical and regulatory problems that would arise if banks, investment
companies, arbitrageurs and others enter into a Rule 145 transaction with marketable securities, but receive
securities subject to trading restrictions. Because the question of the underwriter status of persons taking
substantial portions of registered offerings arises in connection with all registered offerings, the Commission
believes that the matter should be dealt with in a more comprehensive manner after further study, and not just
in the limited context of business combinations.
Id. at 82,201-202.
233. Id. at 82,202.
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such transaction is submitted for vote or consent, who offers or sells securities acquired in
such transaction, shall be deemed to be engaged in a distribution and therefore an
underwriter, except with respect to the limited resales permitted pursuant to paragraph (d) of
Rule 145. Moreover, from a practical standpoint, because such persons usually are in a
position to verify the accuracy of information set forth in the registration statement, and
usually are in a position to influence the transaction, the Commission believes that this
provision is not unreasonably burdensome.23 4
The indication in the Commission's explanatory release is that rule 145(c) is
patterned after rule 133(c), as amended in 1959.235 Under both rules, the question of
underwriter status for recipients of securities in a business combination is resolved "at
the time any such transaction is submitted for vote or consent." The inquiry at that
critical moment in the preliminaries to the actual issuance of securities by a surviving
company is whether a prospective recipient is an affiliate of the company that is being
acquired. The Commission's decision to rely upon rule 133(c) in delineating its
regulation for resales of securities issued in rule 145 transactions ignores the rela-
tionship that must exist between the transfer restrictions that necessarily follow from
underwriter status and the transaction that is responsible for them.
As previously noted, rule 133(c) was designed as a protective measure against
indirect distributions of unregistered securities. It reflected a judgment, borne out in
practice, that for those persons who were in a position to influence the acquired
company, and thus to influence the transaction, the acquisition and disposition of the
acquiring company's securities did not have to be distinct and separate transactions.
Paragraph (c) of rule 133 prevented affiliates of private companies from arranging a
business combination with a public company and transforming themselves into
nonaffiliates with marketable securities that they could immediately liquidate. It also
reflected a concern for public investors who inevitably became subpurchasers in a
distribution by an issuer that lacked the disclosure that accompanies a registered
offering. Regardless of its logical inconsistencies, rule 133(c) was defensible when
tested against the purposes of the Act.
However, rule 145 proceeds on an entirely different theory. It reaffirms the
literal application of section 5 to business combinations and assures the protections of
that provision for affiliates and nonaffiliates of an acquired company and, indirectly,
for subpurchasers in the after market. Where the business combination is accom-
plished by means of an effective registration statement, the acquiring company's
transaction is defined by the various delivery and reporting obligations that the statute
and administrative rules exact from an issuer. In this context, where the issuer has
done all that the Act requires, resales by recipients of the registered securities are
clearly distinct and should proceed with whatever freedom for securityholders that
ordinarily follows any other registered offering. Nothing in the Act compels that a
person acquiring a substantial part of a registered offering should be treated
differently from any other investor with a large investment interest in the issuer unless
234. Id.
235. Rule 133(c) contained a condition for underwriter status that was omitted from rule 145(c). Rule 133(c)
identified as an underwriter any affiliate of the disappearing company who acquired securities "with a view to the
distribution thereof." Id. at 82,202.
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the purchaser becomes an affiliate as a result of the purchase. When a purchaser
becomes an affiliate because of his additional holdings, the resale limitations that
await him will arise not from his acquiring transaction, but from his status vis-a-vis
the issuer and from the nature of his transferring transaction.
The Commission's traditional response to suggestions that it adopt a policy that
would insulate all purchasers of registered securities from underwriter status is to
point to the practical implications of that approach. In the area of business
combinations the primary administrative concern has been with the acquisition of a
company that has a small number of securityholders. 236 Suppose, for example, that
an acquiring company uses a significant amount of its registered securities to
purchase the business assets of a company that is owned by one person but he or she
does not end up as an affiliate of the issuer. Because the Commission is concerned
that the owner of the acquired company might sell publicly all of the acquiring
company's securities free of any prospectus delivery duties, it has not wanted to say
that the distribution ended with the affiliate of the acquired company. In a registered
offering of this dimension the affiliate who negotiated the transaction with the
acquiring company is like the buyer in a private placement and, in the SEC's opinion,
should suffer the same underwriter taint. Although the Commission's concern is
legitimate, the solution, as expressed in rule 145(c), is inappropriate. Paragraph (c)
does not discriminate between registered offerings that are truly public and those that
are essentially private. Nor does it distinguish between acquiring companies that are
subject to the periodic reporting requirements of the Exchange Act, where disclosure
to public investors is continuous, and those that are not subject to periodic reporting
and find their disclosure obligations ending with the securityholders of the acquired
company. For those registered offerings to securityholders of an acquired company
that are actually public in nature the resale limitations created by rule 145(c) serve
no purpose. Instead of the blunderbuss solution of rule 145(c) the remedy, to the
extent that it is needed, should be tailored to the troublesome transactions that involve
"public" registered offerings in name only. In this way the resale limitations that
accompany underwriter status would be serving a purpose that is related to the
issuer's transaction while at the same time ignoring those affiliates of an acquired
company who should be viewed properly as the real public purchasers.
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEsis
The registration and prospective delivery requirements of the 1933 Act were
designed for transactions by issuers and affiliates that take the form of public
offerings. In many securities transactions by these persons, both registered and
unregistered, the objectives inherent in relevant regulations are fully attainable
without the necessity for resale restraints. 237 In certain transactions, however, an
issuer or an affiliate structures its transaction in such a way that the underlying
236. The Commission's concern developed into a so-called negotiated transaction doctrine. See Wheat Report,
supra note 12, at 262-66.
237. E.g., Unregistered offerings that are effected by an issuer or an affiliate pursuant to Regulation A do not require
resale restraints. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-264 (1987).
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purpose of the statutory or administrative regulations that apply to the transaction
cannot be assured without the imposition of such restraints. 238 To be sure an issuer or
affiliate's choice of a particular transactional structure can be influenced by the
knowledge that certain options carry resale limitations. But it is the nature of the
transaction that determines the applicable regulation and it is the purpose of that
statutorily based regulation that might call for an abridgment of a securityholder's
right of free alienability. It is in this respect that resale limitations are inexorably
linked to the transaction concept.
The preceding parts have explored this relationship by organizing limitations in
terms of their origin in either an acquiring or transferring transaction, and by
considering what can occur when a resale limitation is evaluated in the abstract or in
isolation from the objective of the applicable regulation. In the remainder of this
Article, I will discuss four of the implications of this relationship for those who
establish or interpret resale limitation policy under the Act.
A. Validity of Restraints
The relationship that must exist between a resale limitation and the transaction
out of which it flows has important implications in justifying particular restrictions.
As stated above, in order for a resale limitation to be valid it must help significantly
to effectuate the purpose of the statutorily based exemption or regulatory policy
applicable to the originating transaction.
1. Investment and Coming to Rest Requirements
Where a transaction is initiated by an issuer or an affiliate, the statute and its
legislative history justify regulatory measures that prevent it from becoming a
distribution without the safeguards of registration. This means that issuer-imposed
limitations of holding period requirements that arise because of reliance on rule 504
and 505, sections 4(2) and 4(6), of territorially prescribed trading that stem from
sections 3(a)(l 1) and Release No. 4708,239 and affiliate-imposed restraints that are
needed because of a claimed section 4(1-1/2) exemption are all defensible. 240 In each
of these transactions the policy underlying the exemption, which is traceable to a
specific statutory provision, is furthered by a condition that restricts the free
alienability of the securities sold.
2. Volume, Manner of Sale, and Disclosure Requirements
The remaining restraints concern volume, method of sale, and the availability of
information about the issuer. 241 These limitations are embodied in varying degrees in
rules 144 and 145, for use in connection with public resales, and in the suggested
238. E.g., An issuer that confines its offering to residents of its state of organization and then claims an exemption
under § 3(a)(11) must satisfy the coming to rest requirement before allowing interstate resales.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 86-104.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 143-46.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
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criteria for section 4(1-1/2), to be invoked in private resales. The validity of these
restraints is discussed in terms of public and private resales.
a. Public Resales by Affiliates
Congress intended that the registration requirements apply to affiliates whether
or not the securities were encumbered in the hands of the controlling person. It
expressed this policy in section 2(11) by defining an underwriter as any person who
either sells for an affiliate or purchases from an affiliate with a view towards
distribution. Since an affiliate's public resales are likely to be made through agents
and might evolve into a secondary distribution, and since a secondary public offering
"may possess all the dangers attendant upon a new offering of securities,"-2 4 2 the
SEC is fully justified in placing rule 144 restraints on an affiliate's transferring
transaction. Thus, even though an affiliate intends to publicly resell unrestricted
securities "all the dangers" of a new public offering are present and the limitations
of rule 144(c), (e), (f), and (h) are warranted. The same can be said for his public
resale of restricted securities that have been beneficially owned for such an extended
period of time that no one doubts the termination of the acquiring transaction.
243
b. Public Resales by Nonaffiliates
A nonaffiliate's resales of unrestricted securities are usually free of any restraint
regardless of the volume, timing, or manner of sale. In those situations in which some
version of the presumptive underwriter doctrine applies244 and the nonaffiliate must
conform his resales to the volume limitations of rule 144(e), the restraints are
traceable to the size of the holder's purchase in the acquiring transaction. But the
volume limitations that the nonaffiliate faces serve no purpose in the regulation of the
acquiring transaction. The limitations of rule 144(e) are intended to control the
transferring transaction. However, the Commission lacks statutory authority to
regulate a nonaffiliate's transferring transaction where the securities are unrestricted.
The presumptive underwriter doctrine, therefore, is indefensible. The same reasoning
and conclusion applies to the Commission's broad-based attempt to limit the quantity
of a nonaffiliate's resales under rule 145(c) and (d).2 45
A nonaffiliate who intends to sell securities acquired from an issuer or an affiliate
in a transaction in which a holding period limitation was imposed246 will be unable
to claim section 4(1) if he is deemed to have (i) purchased from the issuer or affiliate
242. Report of Committee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14
(1933), quoted more fully supra in text accompanying note 47.
243. See infra text accompanying notes 247-48.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 126-31.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 215-36. H. KwmKE, THE SEC AND ComuORAE DiscLosuRE: REGuLATioN iN
SEARCH OF A PURMSE 248-63 (1979); Ahrenholz & Van Valkenberg, The Presumptive Underwriter Doctrine: Statutory
Underwriter Status for Investors Purchasing a Specified Portion of a Registered Offering, 1973 UTH L. REV. 773,
792-96.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 79-90; 142-46.
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with a view to distribution, (ii) sold for the issuer or affiliate in connection with a
distribution, or (iii) participated in a distribution by the issuer or affiliate. In order to
avoid one or more of these inferences, a nonaffiliate holding restricted securities must
be able to establish that the securities have come to rest in his hands and that, therefore,
any resale constitutes a separate transaction from the original transaction by the issuer
or affiliate. A nonaffiliate who retains beneficial ownership of such securities for a
significant period of time provides objective evidence that he did not acquire the
securities with a view to distribution, will not be selling them for the issuer or affiliate
in connection with, or as a participant in , a distribution by the issuer or affiliate. 247
The length of time that a securityholder retains beneficial ownership of restricted
securities should be the only factor for determining the independence of his resale
transaction. 248
Rule 144(d) assists a nonaffiliate owner of restricted securities by fixing the
minimum period of retention at two years. As discussed earlier, this resale limitation
serves a valid purpose of the originating transaction and rule 144(d) adds useful
clarification. 249 But rule 144 imposes additional burdens as well. All of the restraints
in paragraphs (c), (e), (f), and (h) are designed to regulate the nonaffiliate's
transferring transaction and bear no relationship to the regulatory policies applicable
to the acquiring transaction. 250 Because the Commission has no statutory authority to
regulate an independent transferring transaction by a nonaffiliate who is not an
247. United States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
248. Rule 144(k) supports this proposition. It eliminates all of the restraints of rule 144(c), (e), (f), and (h) from
resales of restricted securities by a nonaffiliate "provided the securities have been beneficially owned by such person for
a period of at least three years prior to their sale." 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(k) (1987). The propriety of a three-year holding
period is a separate issue. See infra text accompanying note 266.
249. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(2), (3), & (4) (1987).
250. In Release No. 5223, supra note 85, announcing the adoption of rule 144, the Commission offered the
following justification for applying factors other than the length of time a person has held the securities:
mhe Commission hereby emphasizes and draws attention to the fact that the statutory language of Section 2(11)
is in the disjunctive. Thus, it is insufficient to conclude that a person is not an underwriter solely because he
did not purchase securities from an issuer with a view to their distribution. It must also be established that the
person is not offering or selling for an issuer in connection with the distribution of the securities and that the
person does not participate or have a participation in any such undertaking, and does not participate or have a
participation in any such underwriting of such an undertaking... In view of the legislative history, statutory
language and judicial interpretations of Sections 2(11), 4(1), and 4(2) of the Act, and in light of the many helpful
suggestions and comments received on the proposed -160 Series" of rules and thereafter on proposed Rule 144,
the Commission is of the view that "distribution" is the significant concept in interpreting the statutory term
"underwriter." In determining when a person is deemed not to be engaged in a distribution several factors must
be considered.
Id. at 81,053.The Commission is correct in noting the disjunctive nature of the four clauses in § 2(11) and in emphasizing
that the claimant of a § 4(l) exemption must prove his entitlement by establishing that he is not an underwriter. However,
as a practical matter, an ordinary securityholder is unlikely to be deemed to have offered or sold for an issuer or an
affiliate-4the first clause of § 2(1 1)-in the absence of an agreement with the issuer or affiliate. See generally 7B J.W.
lhcKs, supra note 26, § 9.02[3]. The other two categories of underwriter, clauses 3 and 4, are also unrealistic threats to
a nonaffiliate holder of restricted securities. These two categories of "participants" in a distribution of securities appear
to have been intended for certain professionals in the securities industry. See 7B J.W. Hicxs, supra note 26, § 9.02[4].
With these categories eliminated for nonaffiliates, the nonaffiliate's only practical concern is how to establish that he did
not purchase securities from an issuer or an affiliate with a view to their distribution. The holding period factor is the
answer.
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underwriter or participant in a distribution, 251 the nonholding period restraints of rule
144 cannot be justified. 252
c. Private Resales by Affiliates
Congress did not choose direct regulation of secondary distributions.53 An
affiliate loses his claim to section 4(1) by becoming an underwriter or by reselling
significant amounts of securities through or with the assistance of an underwriter.
Where an affiliate privately resells unrestricted securities, or restricted securities that
have come to rest in his hands, to a limited number of person who do not take with
a view towards distribution, he is entitled to claim the ordinary trading exemption. In
order to avoid having his purchasers resell prematurely and thereby become
underwriters, an affiliate must avoid general advertising or solicitation that would
constitute offers to the public and must limit the timing of resales by his transferees.
Where an affiliate takes these precautions with respect to sales of unrestricted
securities, his transferring transaction does not constitute a distribution and neither he
nor his transferee becomes an underwriter or a participant in a transaction by an issuer
or underwriter. His private sale should be exempted from section 5 even where his
purchaser is unsophisticated and without access to information about the issuer.254
Although the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts require that an affiliate
disclose to his private buyer any material nonpublic information concerning the issuer
that he knows, nothing in the 1933 Act or its legislative history supports imposing a
disclosure obligation on the affiliate as a condition for a section 4(1-1/2) exemption.
d. Private Resales by Nonaffiliates
A nonaffiliate's private resale of unrestricted securities is always exempted by
section 4(1). Where a nonaffiliate resells restricted securities he will be ineligible for
an exemption under section 4(1) if he is deemed to have (i) acquired the securities
from an issuer or an affiliate with a view to distribution, (ii) sold them for the issuer
or affiliate in connection with a distribution, or (iii) participated in a distribution by an
issuer or affiliate. Once a nonaffiliate meets the holding period requirement that the
issuer or affiliate has properly imposed on him, his resale transaction is distinct from
the acquiring transaction.5 5 Section 4(1-1/2) should have no application after the
251. "Participation" as used in the text refers to the judicial construction of § 4(1) as developed in SEC v. Chinese
Consol. Benevolent Ass'n, 39 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), rev'd, 120 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618
(1941), discussed supra text accompanying notes 65-72. It has been confused with the terms "participates" and
"participation" in the third and fourth clauses of § 2(11). See, e.g., SEC v. International Chem. Dev. Corp., 469 F.2d
20, 33 (10th Cir. 1972). See generally 7B J.W. HtcKs, supra note 26, § 9.02[4][b][ii].
252. H. KRrPKE, supra note 245, at 243-48.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 45-55.
254. Cf. A Report to the Committee on Federal Regulations of Securities from the Study Group on Section "4
(1-112)" of the Subcommittee on 1933 Act, The Section "4 (1-112)" Phenomenon: Private Resales of "Restricted"
Securities, 34 Bus. LAw. 1961 (1979) [hereinafter ABA Report], at 1975-1976. Contra Olander & Jacks, supra note 141,
at 363; Comment, supra note 141, at 700-02. As discussed supra text accompanying notes 185-214, the issue of a
disclosure obligation within the context of § 4(1-1/2) has been linked to a determination of the proper scope of SEC v.
Ralston Purina.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 247-48.
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securities have come to rest. Thereafter, he should be free to resell restricted securities
publicly or privately without having to impose any limitations on his purchaser. 25 6
B. Particularized Implementation
The validity of a resale limitation does not guarantee its fairness for the type of
transaction that it helps to regulate. To ensure that a restraint is not unnecessarily
onerous for a securityholder, resale limitation policy should discriminate among the
various categories of transactions in which a particular form of restraint may be
imposed. It should also tailor specific characteristics of a restraint to the objectives of
the governing regulations. These conditions of fairness are tested against holding
period and coming to rest restraints, two types of limitations which I have judged to
be valid for use in connection with certain transactions. 257
Evidence of SEC concern for particularized implementation of resale policy is
found in the application of the coming to rest doctrine. Instead of using an omnibus
standard to define the phrase "coming to rest," the SEC has fashioned a definition
that recognizes a purpose for the doctrine in a section 3(a)(1 1) transaction that is not
the same when it is invoked in reference to a transaction that satisfies the conditions
of Release No. 4708. As a result the doctrine yields different restraints. Purchasers
in an intrastate offering must endure a ban on interstate trading for a period of either
nine months or one year. 258 On the other hand, foreign investors will find the offering
in their acquiring transaction coming to rest as quickly as ninety days after the last
sale by the issuer. 259 However, the SEC apparently has ignored this principle of
fairness in its treatment of the holding period requirement.
A mandatory period of retention accompanies securities that an issuer or affiliate
transfers in a nonpublic offering or in issuer transactions under rules 504 or 505 of
Regulation D.26 0 The SEC has determined in its formulation of rule 144(d)(1) that
regardless of which exemption controlled the acquiring transaction, two years is the
appropriate holding period for a beneficial owner of restricted securities. By adopting
a single standard for securities that can attain restricted status in more than one
way,261 the Commission has overlooked the different purposes of the restraint. A
holding period requirement is essential to sections 4(2) and 4(6); it is not required at
all by section 3(b). Consequently, where the SEC determines to impose such a
restraint on securities issued pursuant to a section 3(b) exemption, as it has under
256. ABA Report, supra note 254, at 1975-76.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 239-40. On November 22, 1986, Linda C. Quinn, Director of the SEC
Division of Corporation Finance addressed the annual fall meeting of the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee. In
her speech, entitled "Redefining 'Public Offering or Distribution' For Today," she described the administrative rules for
determining when securities sold outside the registration process in the United States or overseas come to rest as being
"all over the lot" and explained that "we've not yet started to wrestle with this issue." For reasons stated in the text,
instead of being a detriment, such a diversity of holding periods is probably a necessity.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 91-97.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 98-104. See also 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(1) (1987) where the three
standards for calculating volume limitations under rule 144 reflect particularized implementation depending on the nature
of the issuer and recent trading activity in its securities.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 79-90.
261. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3) (1987).
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rules 504 and 505, it is free to prescribe a retention period that bears no resemblance
to the one it uses in other circumstances.
Even where a restraint is shaped to conform generally with the objectives of an
exemption, fairness dictates that it be further refined. Consider, for example, the
valid restraint that is required under section 3(a)(1 1). Although the Commission has
contributed to the fairness of the coming to rest requirement by providing an objective
test in rule 147(e), it is unclear why the SEC selected nine months as the prescribed
duration of the limitation. Presumably the SEC wanted to encourage issuers to use
rule 147 and intended the shorter ban on interstate trading to serve as an inducement.
The one year moratorium, which applies for offerings outside the rule, is thought to
be based on the Brooklyn Manhattan Transit case, 262 in which the Commission
equated the life of an intrastate public offering with the duration of the average
interstate public offering, as determined by Congress for purposes of a dealer's
prospectus delivery obligations under the third clause of section 4(l).263 In 1954
Congress amended the dealers' exemption to require a dealer to deliver copies of a
statutory prospectus for a period of forty or ninety days depending upon the nature of
the registrant. 264 If the Commission was correct in 1935 in equating the duration of
the two restraints involved, an issuer's intrastate offering today should come to rest
long before the time established by rule 147(e). It may well be that section 4(3)
should not serve as the proxy for fixing the appropriate duration of a resale limitation
under section 3(a)(1l).265 But the precise term that is selected should be no more
severe than is needed to achieve the intended objective. Also, it should come with an
explanation that allows for a judgment on severity and reasonableness.2 66
The principle of particularized implementation has another aspect. The transac-
tional nature of the registration controls should not be used to create or intensify a
resale limitation where the purpose of an independent regulation is already being
served. An illustrative threat to this element of fair resale limitation policy is a
$400,000 intrastate offering by a local issuer to ten sophisticated residents. Although
262. In re Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., I S.E.C. 147 (1935).
263. Id. at 162-63. See, e.g., 1 L. Loss, supra note 171, at 597. The Commission warned that the one year period
should be seen as a presumption but not "as a conclusive presumption of law, as in the third clause of Section 4(1) of
the Act, but as a presumption of fact subject to refutation upon a showing a fact that distribution was completed within
less than one year." 1 S.E.C. 147, 162-63 (1935).
264. See H.R. REP. No. 1542, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1954): "The I-year provision with respect to trading
transactions has long been recognized as unrealistic." In 1964 Congress repositioned the dealers' exemption and
renumbered it § 4(3). S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 28-29 (1963); H.R. REP. No. 1418, 88th Co'- Zd Sess
31, 82 (1964).
265. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 171, at 597.
266. The duration of the holding period required for restricted securities should also be tested against the principles
set forth in the text. In announcing the adoption of rule 144, the Commission acknowledged that there had been various
holding periods provided for over the years by administrative interpretations. It then stated that "[a]fter reexamination and
reconsideration, the Commission believes, in keeping with the purposes of the Act in preventing the distribution of
unregistered securities to the public, that the holding period should be two years" for sales made under rule 144(e).
Release No. 5223, supra note 85, at 81,057. See Schneider, Acquisitions Under the Federal Securities Acts-A Program
forReform, 116 U. PA. L. Rav. 1323, 1337 (1968). For purposes of resales under rule 144(k) the holding period is three
years. Although the SEC has not provided a rationale for the holding periods in rule 144 one commentator has suggested
that because the informal two-year rule of thumb of U.S. v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) arose
in a criminal case with higher standards of proof, "a longer holding period might arguably apply in a civil or SEC
enforcement proceeding." T. l{ziE, THE LAw oF SEacRrn= REtALrON 145 (1985).
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the hypothetical issuer could rely on either rule 504 or section 4(2) for an exemption,
it chooses section 3(a)(1 1) because of the shorter resale limitation for its purchasers.
For a period of a few years in the 1970s the SEC staff viewed an offering to a limited
number of persons as tantamount to a private placement and considered the securities
that were issued as restricted for purposes of rule 144.267 As a result of this informal
position, purchasers such as the ten investors in the illustration were expected to hold
their securities for two years prior to public resale. As the staff eventually realized,
selective application of a two year holding period requirement to any nonpublic
offering obscured the decision by Congress to provide alternative regulatory patterns
for an unregistered offering by an issuer, most of which make no reference to the
number of offerees or purchasers. Where a transaction meets all of the conditions of
an exemption, presumably it has satisfied all of the objectives of that regulation. An
additional burden, borrowed from a different regulation, is unnecessary and invalid.
C. Clarity and Predictability
The costs of a resale limitation policy should not be compounded by confusion
and uncertainty. 268 The SEC deserves considerable praise for the clarity and
predictability that it has brought to interpretations of such key terms as "distri-
bution," "investment intent," "coming to rest," and "brokerage transactions. "269
However, given the relationship that exists between the concept of transaction and
resale limitations, an even more crucial term needs to be defined in terms that are
consistent with legislative history and with the competing interests of enforcement
flexibility and resale certainty.
Transferring transactions are the origin of several different forms of resale
limitation. But these restraints arise only where the transferor is an affiliate. 270 Some
of the restraints that emerge from acquiring transactions owe their existence to the
transferor's status as an affiliate. 271 Depending upon how the term "affiliate" is
defined, federal resale limitation policy is either more or less intrusive. A review of
SEC interpretation of this term for purposes of section 2(11) indicates an adminstra-
tive view that is both imprecise and excessive.
267. See, e.g., Golden Enters., Inc., No-action from SEC (Jan. 25, 1977), [1977] CCH Fed. Sec. Microfiche, fiche
6, frame D19 (Section 3(a)(9) transaction); Acceleration Corp., No-action letter from SEC (Nov. 12, 1976), [1971-1976]
Wash. Serv. Bur. Microfiche, fiche 67, frame E13 (section 3(a)(11) transaction); Electronic Data Sys. Corp., No-action
letter from SEC (May 14, 1975), [1971-1976] Wash. Serv. Bur. Microfiche, fiche 47, frame F2 (Section 3(a)(11)
transaction).
268. See, e.g., Wheat Report, supra note 12, at 177:
The lack of objective tests to determine when and how shares issued in a non-public transaction may be offered
publicly provides an unfortunate leeway for the unscrupulous. It has been the Commission's experience that
unprincipled counsel will often give opinions on the availability of exemption for registration when careful or
responsible counsel would not do so. The result of this is to put careful counsel at a marked disadvantage. The
client's objective is immediate cash. The pressures are strong, and the temptation to cut the statutory corner is
magnified by uncertainty.
269. With the exception of "coming to rest," all of these terms are clarified by rule 144. The coming to rest
doctrine has been addressed in rule 147(d) and administrative interpretations of Release 4708.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 142-46.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 105-12.
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The Act contemplates that some person or group of persons will be in control of
every corporation or other business entity. 272 The concept of control, which is crucial
to the regulation of secondary distributions, is not defined in the Act. To complicate
the matter, the issue of what constitutes a control relationship arises in other contexts
of the federal securities laws in which the reasons for the inquiry and the policy goals
to be achieved are different. 273 Judicial and administrative opinions on the meaning
of control for purposes other than section 2(11) might be helpful, but they are not
necessarily reliable when deciding whether a person is an affiliate in the context of
a secondary distribution. 274 Despite the absence of a statutory definition, the
legislative history of section 2(11) does provide two important clues to the meaning
of the undefined term.
First, it seems clear that Congress did not expect section 2(11) to bring within
the registration requirements of the Act all redistributions of outstanding securities.
Instead, it appears that Congress intended the scope of the definitional section,
especially the last sentence, to be limited to redistributions by a person having such
a relationship, direct or indirect, to the issuer as to be in a position to obtain
registration by the issuer.275 Ideally, one might argue, the benefits of the registration
process should have been extended to purchasers in every secondary distribution. As
two early commentators on the exemptive provisions of the Act noted, however,
the limiting of the requirement of registration to those cases of secondary distribution in
which registration by the issuer may be compelled is completely justified upon consideration
of the practical difficulties inherent in the effecting of registration by a non-affiliated person,
the probable inadequacy of any registration thus effected, and the public interest in not
hampering the free interchange of outstanding securities in honest transactions. 276
The second interpretative guideline to the meaning of the control concept in
section 2(11) was stated explicitly in the legislative history. According to the report
of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, the concept of control "is not
a narrow one, depending upon a mathematical formula of 51 percent of voting power,
272. See, e.g., American-Standard, SEC No-action Letter, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
79,071, at 82,313 (Oct. 4, 1972).
273. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(3) (exception to the definition of the term "offer to buy" for preliminary
negotiations between an affiliate and certain underwriters), 77c(a)(2) (1976) (exemption for certain securities issued by
an employer or by a company in a control relationship with the employer), 77o (1976) (liability of controlling persons),
77s (1976) (special powers of Commission in connection with balance sheets or income accounts of control persons), 77aa
Schedule A(17) (1976) (required disclosure in registration statement of commissions paid, in connection with the sale of
the security to be offered, by a control person), & 77p (1976) (liabilities of controlling persons), as amended. See also
SEC Securities Act Form S-3, Gen. Instr. (1)(B)(I), 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 7,152, at 6252, where the
Commission's transactional requirements for use of the form include a reference to the aggregate market value of voting
stock held by non-affiliates.
274. See, e.g., Moerman v. Zipeo, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 422 F.2d 871 (1970) (for
purposes of determining liability under rule 10b-5, the court concluded that the "conclasion is inescapable that persons
who act as directors are in control of the corporation"). See also Vickers v. SEC, 383 F.2d 343, 344 (2d Cir. 1967) (the
court sustained the Commission's finding of control under rule 12b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1987), under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934).
275. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 13-14 (1933). Section 6(a) of the Act requires that at least one copy
of a registration statement filed under the Act be signed by the issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1981).
276. Throop & Lane, Some Problems of Exemption Under the Securities Act of 1933, 4 LAw & CoNraErw. PROB. 89,
119 (1937).
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but is broadly defined to permit the provisions of the act to become effective wherever
the fact of control actually exists. "277
The legislative history suggests that the following test be used to identify those
persons who, because of their relationship to the issuer, should bear the burdens of
registration in connection with a secondary distribution: Does the person possess the
power to cause the issuer to file a registration statement?278 Power, for purposes of
this test, can flow from stock ownership, management responsibility, or business and
personal relationships. 279 A person who meets the conditions of this test is treated
under section 2(11) as equivalent to the original issuer, a characterization that is
easier to comprehend in the case of a person who achieves the status by "directly or
indirectly controlling. . . the issuer." The result is also justified where the person's
affiliation arises from the other two situations contemplated by the last sentence in
section 2(11).
A person who is controlled by an issuer is subject to manipulation by the issuer.
By hypothesis, an issuer can cause a controlled person to file a registration statement
for the public sale of securities issued by the controlled person. A controlled person
(e.g., a majority owned subsidiary) can also effect a secondary distribution, but only
if the issuer approves. Consequently, the two persons are treated alike and the issuer
is not free to accomplish indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly. The
other category of affiliate, a person under common control with an issuer, is
considered a section 2(11) issuer because of his relationship with a person who
controls the issuer. A person under common control with an issuer has a disability
that is shared by a person controlled by an issuer, i.e., he cannot effect a secondary
distribution without the prior consent of the control person. Since a control person
also controls an issuer, it is not unfair to insist that the person under common control
file a registration statement before publicly reselling securities of an issuer.
The theoretical basis of the test for determining whether a control person
constitutes a section 2(11) issuer seems clear and convincing. In practice, the test has
suffered in two respects. First, it is narrow in scope. Certain persons who are not in
a position to cause an issuer to file a registration statement can, nonetheless, disrupt
the ordinary trading market in an issuer's securities by selling a significant amount of
securities to the public. For some courts and, at times, the Commission itself, the
inquiry is not whether a person has the ability to force an issuer to sign a registration
statement, but whether he has the power to influence an issuer's business policies.
The SEC staff regularly employs a more flexible standard for determining affiliation
in responding to inquiries from attorneys and others who seek no-action treatment for
a proposed sale under section 4(1) or rule 144.280 Second, the concept of control that
277. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 14 (1933).
278. The pragmatic test was suggested by Throop & Lane, Some Problems of Exemption Under the Securities Act
of 1933, 4 LAw & CoNTuip. PROB. 89, 118 (1937).
279. See generally Sommer, Who's In Control?-SEC, 21 Bus. LAw. 559 (1966); Campbell, Defining Control in
Secondary Distributions, 18 B.C. IN. & COM. L. Rnv. 37 (1976).
280. See 7B M.W. HicKs, supra note 26, § 10.05[l].
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is embodied in section 2(11) is vague28' and the factors that are used for determining
the existence of control are imprecise. 282 Administrative guidance in the form of Rule
405 offers little assistance in deciding particular cases. 28 3 As noted in the Wheat
Report:
[C]ontrol of a company may arise from a combination of factors and the significance of most
of these may vary from case to case, depending not only on the presence or absence of
certain relationships but also upon the particular circumstances of the company and of the
persons having an interest in it. The factors which would determine who is in control of
General Motors would be far different from the factors which would determine who is in
control of a small over-the-counter company; and even among similar companies, which
case may present different relationships, corporate structures and managerial pattern. 2-4
The Commission has never formally defined the phrase "any person directly or
indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or
indirect common control with the issuer" in section 2(11) for purposes of secondary
distributions of unregistered securities. The Commission has formulated rule 405,
however, a definition of the term control, including the terms "controlling,"
"controlled by," and "under common control with." The definitional rule is
incorporated into Regulation C, a collection of rules that govern every registration of
securities under the Act.2 8 5 Under rule 405, control means "the possession, direct or
indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies
of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or
otherwise."2 6 Under this definition, it is the existence of, rather than the exercise of,
the power that is the crucial factor. Control may turn on "the latent ability to exercise
a dominant influence over the affairs of the controlled person." ' 287 The rule also
makes it clear that the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and
281. The constitutionality of the control concept in § 2(11) was challenged in United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d
779, 783 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946 (1969), where the court dismissed the argument:
It will suffice to say that the appellants' defense was not that they misunderstood or misinterpreted the statute
but that it was beneath their notice and they knew nothing about it. Under these circumstances we need say no
more than that any possible uncertainty in the statute need not trouble us now. There will be time enough to
consider that question when raised by someone whom it concerns.
The appellants' defense, by which they attempted to demonstrate a lack of intent to violate the law, was that they were
unaware of any registration requirement with respect to stock of unlisted companies and that because they operated at such
high levels of corporate finance, they could not be concerned about such "details." See also United States v. Re, 336
F.2d 306, 316 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964), where the court rejected the contention that the concept of
control in § 2(11) is unconstitutionally vague, stating: "The meaning of 'control' under the act is no different than it is
in normal everyday usage. 'The requirement of reasonable certainty does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express
ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding."'
282. Congress was aware of the problem of defining "control," at least in the context of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934:
It would be difficult if not impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the many ways in which actual control may
be exerted. A few examples of the methods used are stock ownership, lease, contract, and agency. It is well
known that actual control sometimes may be exerted through ownership of much less than a majority of the stock
of a corporation either by the ownership of such stock alone or through such ownership in combination with
other factors.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934).
283. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1987) [hereinafter rule 405].
284. Wheat Report, supra note 12, at 158.
285. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.400-499 (1987).
286. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1987).
287. In re Telescript-CSP Inc., 41 S.E.C. 664, 667 (1963).
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policies of a person can stem from (1) the ownership of voting securities, (2) a
contract, or (3) "otherwise."
Although rule 405 was not intended as an interpretation of the operative phrase
in the second sentence of section 2(11), the Commission has utilized it for that
purpose in its administrative proceedings. 288 It also invokes rule 405 as the
appropriate source for determining a person's status as an affiliate for purposes of rule
144.289 The use of rule 405 by the SEC and its staff in the context of section 2(11)
would hardly merit comment were it not for the fact that in doing so it has neglected
the qualification of control suggested by the legislative history. Instead of asking
whether a person has the power to cause the issuer to file a registration statement, the
SEC's inquiry is whether a person has the power to direct or cause the direction of
"the management and policies of person." 290 In many cases, the answer to the
specific inquiry intended by Congress will be implicit in the answer to rule 405's
broader question. In some cases, it will not.
It might be expected that judicial interpretations of the second sentence in
section 2(11) have set the record straight but, unfortunately, they are not uniform. 29'
For purposes of analysis they can be grouped into three classes. In the first group are
those decisions that indicate as the basis for finding a particular person in control of
an issuer that he was in a position to obtain the required signatures of the issuer and
its officers and directors on a registration statement.292 In a second group of decisions
the determination of control under section 2(11) is reported without any statement of
the applicable legal standard. 293 In the third group are those decisions where the
courts have justified a finding that an individual qualifies as a section 2(11) affiliate
288. Id.
289. American Standard, SEC No-action Letter [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,071,
at 82,313 (Oct. 4, 1972).
290. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1987).
291. See, e.g., SEC v. Computronic Indus. Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1136, 1139 (N.D. Tex. 1968), where the court
construed § 2(11) and rule 405: "Under the aegis of Section 19(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 ... the Commission
defined 'control' and all its derivations to include at the very least any officer or director of the issuer."
292. See Pennaluna & Co. v. SEC, 410 F.2d 861,865-66 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970); SEC
v. International Chem. Dev. Corp., 469 F.2d 20, 28 (10th Cir. 1972); SEC v. American Beryllium & Oil Corp., 303 F.
Supp. 912, 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 106, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
modified, 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, 148 F. Supp. 558, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1957),
permanent injunction, 167 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd sub nom., SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Ci.
1959). In Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1362 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1976), the court
relied on this test to find the requisite control for purposes of § 2(11). The court based its finding on the fact that the
individual involved had directly participated in (I) the reorganization of the issuer, (2) the change of its management, (3)
the removal of restrictive legends on certain of its stock certificates, and (4) the creation of an over-the-counter market
in the stock.
293. See SEC v. Netelkos, 592 F. Supp. 906, 913-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), where the court found the following two
individuals to be in control of the issuer, Falcon Sciences, Inc., because each "possessed and exercised the power to direct
the management and policies" of the issuer. (1) Netelkos was an active participant in the day-to-day operation of Falcon
and attended virtually every meeting of Falcon's board of directors, despite the fact that he had no official position on the
board, and (2) Gamarekian; as to whom the court found:
His involvement with Falcon was extensive and included complete control over Falcon's stock transfer
operations, management of Falcon's EOR field testing, supply purchases for those tests, and substantially all
the contracts between Falcon and the market-makers of Falcon's stock. At a company the size of Falcon, control
over this variety of significant work functions constitutes substantial control over the entire corporation.
Id. at 914-15. See also SEC v. Antoine Silver Mines, Ltd., 299 F. Supp. 414, 416 (N.D. ll. 1968); United States v.
Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, 167 F. Supp. 716, 738 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
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by noting the relevance of one or more of the traditional indicia of control under rule
405.294 In all but the first group of decisions, it is impossible to ascertain from the
written opinions whether the courts have faithfully adhered to the limited test for
control that Congress intended for section 2(11).
D. The Bottom Line: Investor Protection and Fewer Restraints
The thesis of this Article is that the nature of a securities transaction determines
the form of regulation and that the validity and scope of any resale limitation must be
judged by the function it serves in furthering statutorily based regulation of that
transaction. If this standard were applied to the present resale limitation policy, some
restraints would continue to regulate resales in appropriate instances although their
scope might be diminished: the holding period and coming to rest requirements and,
for affiliates only, the conditions of rule 144 and the manner of sale limits of section
4(1-1/2). Many restraints on resales by nonaffiliates would disappear: the volume
controls under the various forms of the presumptive underwriter doctrine, rule 145(c)
and (d), all of the conditions of rule 144, other than paragraph (d), and any limitations
on private sales of restricted securities after an adequate period of retention. The issue
remains whether these relaxations would jeopardize public confidence in our
securities markets and reduce investor protection in unregistered offerings.
Resale limitation policy, if reformed under the proposed criteria, would leave
intact all of the major restraints on unregistered distributions, direct or indirect, by an
issuer or an affiliate. The thrust of the practical implications of the thesis is confined
to resales by nonaffiliates. Even if this category of seller is expanded, as it would
under a definition of affiliate that conforms to legislative intent, 295 public resales of
restricted securities by nonaffiliates without direct rule 144-type restraints would not
leave public investors unprotected. Anticipated problems of general solicitation or
advertising, extra compensation, and insufficient disclosure concerning the issuer
would have their greatest impact on resales effected through brokers. The SEC
already has exercised authority under the 1934 Act to address each of these concerns
with specific broker-dealer regulations.2 96 If necessary the SEC or the NASD could
294. See SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 334 F. Supp. 444, 455 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 477 F.2d 920
(5th Cir. 1973), where the court stated that the "indicia of control evidenced by the defendants included stock ownership,
directorship positions, officerships, family ties, creditor positions and 'dominating persuasiveness.' "In the following
cases, the courts' findings of control under § 2(11) were supported by a citation to Rule 405: SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d
241, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1959); SEC v. Computronie Indus. Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1136, 1139 (N.D. Tex. 1968); SEC v.
Bond & Share Corp., 229 F. Supp. 88, 95 (W.D. Okla. 1963). In SEC v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D.N.Y.
1959), the court rejected the Commission's claim that Sherwood was a control person at the time he resold unregistered
securities. "[A]Ithough Sherwood dominated 8% of the total issued stock, he was unable to secure a representation on
the board of directors, he had a falling-out with John Christopher Doyle, who appears to have been the dominant figure
in the management of [the issuer] and Sherwood was unable to free the bulls of his shares for distribution until Doyle
consented thereto."
295. See supra text accompanying note 278.
296. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10(b) (5) (general antifraud), 10(b) (10) (disclosure of commission where broker-dealer acts
as agent), 15el-2 (antifraud rule as to broker-dealer in over-the-counter markets), & 15c2- 1 (1987) (minimal information
concerning issuer required before broker-dealer may enter quotation on an over-the-counter security). See also Etlinger
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 835 F.2d 1031, 1033-36 (3d Cir. 1987), where the court held that a
broker-dealer's failure to disclose commissions on the sale of zero-coupon bonds constituted a violation of rule lOb-5 and
that the claim was not precluded by rule t0b-10.
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adopt additional guidelines or controls that would apply directly to broker-dealers. 297
As for the absence of volume controls on these securities, many transactions that do
not meet the quantity limits of rule 144(e) are executed daily in the retail markets
without disruptions in ordinary trading or indications of manipulation. Some issuers
and other sellers undoubtedly claim exemptions for transactions that, although in
technical compliance with their conditions, are part of a plan to evade the registration
provisions of the Act. It is even possible that a liberalized resale limitation policy
would increase the incidence of schemes. But invalid resale restraints that burden
innocent market participants as well should not be used to curb these abuses,
especially when other enforcement tools, specifically designed for these concerns,
can be deployed directly against the violators.
A resale policy that is structured within the guidelines suggested here would
produce more advantages than the obvious reduction of costly restraints on securities
transactions and the resulting economic benefits. It would eliminate some of the
complexity in the law that has confounded not only those who must interpret it but
also those who attempt to comply with its demands. It would reduce the risk of
violation for nonaffiliates whose resales must satisfy numerous restraints under rule
144 if the section 4(1) trading exemption is to apply. It would remove from ordinary
securityholders the in terrorem effect of section 12(1) and the various administrative
sanctions that Congress intended primariliy for issuers and affiliates. It would reflect
the relatively narrow mission of the 1933 Act and leave to regulatory policy rooted
in the broader based 1934 Act the task of governing securities professionals and
secondary trading. Finally, it would move closer to striking a proper balance between
public protection and securityholder freedom.
297. The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) is the self-policing organization to which the vast
majority of brokers or dealers belong. It adopts rules and guidelines that supplement SEC regulation. See, e.g., NASD
Man. (CCH) 2154 (Mar. 1988) (the so-called 5% mark-up policy). See generally L. Loss, FuNDNisrrAuS OF SEcuRni
REauLAirON 689-94 (1983); Cary, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A. J. 244 (1963).
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